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PROCESS: THE SUMMARY ANNUAL
REPORT
J. Robert Brown, Jr.*
Stephen M. DeTore**
In 1986 the staff of the Division of Corporate Finance of
the SEC issued two letters approving the use of a summary
annual report. These letters have acceded to management a
great amount of discretion in connection with the annual report.
The summary annual report costs less to produce than the con-
ventional annual report and a decision about its use may en-
courage a re-examination of the shareholder communication
process. However, uncertainty exists over whether the summary
annual report will implicate concerns under the securities laws.
EVERY SPRING, most corporations engage in the modern day
version of the town meeting. In accordance with state law,'
these corporations at least annually convene a meeting of all their
shareholders. The meetings provide a forum not only for electing
directors and approving accountants, but also for questioning
management about high salaries, generous options, and other con-
cerns which may arise.
Although often colorful, the annual meeting has become
largely a formality.2 Unable or unwilling to attend the meeting in
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law; Holland & Hart, Den-
ver, Colorado; B.A., William and Mary (1978); J.D., University of Maryland (1980);
M.A., Georgetown University (1984).
** Attorney, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities & Exchange Commission,
Washington, D.C.; B.A., Northeastern University (1977); J.D., Suffolk University (1980).
As a matter of policy, the Securities and Exchange Commission disclaims responsibil-
ity for any private publications by any of its employees, past or present. The views in this
article are those solely of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Com-
mission or any colleagues at the Commission.
1. State law generally requires corporations to hold meetings of shareholders on an
annual basis. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1953).
2. Annual meetings provide an opportunity for gadflies and other corporate neo-
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person, 3 most shareholders exercise their franchise through the
proxy process." Given the importance of this process, it is not sur-
prising that proxy solicitations have been subject to substantial
regulation. In addition to minimal regulation under state law, 5 the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has adopted a com-
prehensive set of rules governing the proxy process.'
The proxy rules attempt to ensure that shareholders have suf-
ficient information to make informed decisions when executing
their proxies. Publicly traded companies7 that solicit proxies must
phytes to wax poetic about various issues. See Hughes, Wickes Cos. Holders Vent Their
Anger Over Stock's Plunge, Wall St. J., June 23, 1988 at 16, col. 3 ("Angry Shareholders
of Wickes Cos. begged Ming the Merciless to become Ming the Merciful at the company's
raucous annual meeting.").
3. With the growth in the number of shareholders, attendance at meetings has been
impractical and, perhaps, undesired. As one court noted: "It would be stupid indeed to
assume that eight thousand shareholders may possibly attend the meeting in person ....
It would require 'Boyle's thirty Acres' to accommodate them." Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 108 N.J. Eq. 148, 151, 154 A. 321, 322 (N.J. Ch. 1931). See also Mackin v. Nicol-
let Hotel, 25 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1982).
The old theory which seemed to dominate the earlier writers to the effect that
every stockholder in a corporation is entitled to have the benefit of a judgment of
every other stockholder in the selection of a board of directors, has necessarily
been rendered obsolete because of our modern business being conducted by large
corporations with thousands of stockholders located in all parts of the country.
Manifestly a meeting of the stockholders of such organizations would be not
only impracticable but impossible.
Id. at 786.
4. Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1489,
1490 (1970)("It is well known that proxy voting has become the dominant mode of share-
holder decision making in publicly held corporations."). See also J. HURST, THE LEGITI-
MACY OF THE BUSINEss CORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 94
(1970)("The core reality of stockholder suffrage in the big company lay in the use of proxy
machinery."); SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 77TH CONG., 1ST Sss., REPORT
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACr OF 1934-35 (Comm. Print
1941) ("Ownership of securities is so widely diffused that voting by stockholders in corpo-
rate meetings is today affected almost entirely by proxies.").
5. Some states did impose a few, ineffective restrictions on management's use of
proxies. For instance, salaried officers were not permitted to become proxyholders. Early
statutes also limited the number of shares that a proxyholder could vote. See Dodd, Statu-
tory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 33 (1936). None-
theless, over time, state law ceased to impose any real limits on management's use of the
proxy process. Id. at 35 (noting that the 1903 revisions of the Massachusetts corporate
code "marked the end of any attempt . . . to put obstacles in the way of control of the
proxy machinery by the management").
6. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to .14b-2 (1988). For a discussion of the mechanics of
the proxy rules, see Goelzer & Brown, Preparation of Proxy Materials, in MEETINGS OF
STOCKHOLDERS 49 (1987).
7. In general, publicly traded refers to those companies with a class of securities
registered under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (current version at
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provide shareholders with a proxy statement which discusses the
proposals to be presented at the meeting, and any harmful impact
resulting from their approval.8 Prior to the annual meeting at
which directors will be elected, management must also supply
shareholders with an annual report, which contains financial and
other information needed to assess the company's performance
over the past year.'
The proxy rules, however, may not always advance the inter-
ests of shareholders and management by requiring disclosure
through two separate documents - a proxy statement and an an-
nual report. Under this bifurcated disclosure process, a share-
holder may need to search both documents to uncover the facts
needed to intelligently execute the proxy. The two-document re-
quirement also raises complex timing problems."0 Because the
documents are often mailed separately, shareholders are some-
times forced to execute a proxy without having both documents
present. Finally, extensive SEC regulation of the contents of an-
nual reports, through the proxy rules, has impaired the effective-
ness of the document as a device for communicating with share-
holders. Content regulation not only has eliminated much of
management's drafting flexibility but also has increased costs.
Perhaps in recognition of these problems, the staff of the
SEC's Division of Corporation Finance has taken a major step to-
ward harmonizing the Commission's goal of ensuring meaningful
disclosure in the proxy process with management's desire to com-
municate with shareholders through a report unfettered by form
and content rules. In early 1986, the staff issued two letters ap-
proving the use of a summary annual report.11 These letters indi-
cated that the information normally required in the annual report
15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1986)), or traded on an exchange under Section 12(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1986)). Companies filing a
registration statement are subject to the periodic reporting requirements, but not the proxy
rules. See Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 781(d) (1986)).
8. See. e.g., Disclosure in Proxy and Information Statements; Anti-Takeover or
Similar Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 15,230, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 81,748 (Oct. 13, 1978)(requiring disclosure of disadvantages of anti-take-
over charter and bylaw amendments).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(1) (1988).
10. See infra notes 20, 125-27 and accompanying text.
11. McKesson Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (May 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file); General Motors Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,401 (Jan. 20, 1987).
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
could instead be appended to the proxy statement. Once this ap-
pended statement had been issued, companies were free to dis-
tribute to shareholders a summary report containing condensed fi-
nancial information. Therefore, shareholders would receive both a
single, integrated proxy statement, containing all of the informa-
tion needed to execute a proxy, and a simpler, more readable sum-
mary annual report.12
The staff position represents a throwback of sorts. In 1942,
the Commission proposed the use of a single, integrated proxy
statement that included financial information, but abandoned the
proposal in the face of withering opposition. 3 The position also
provides immediate benefits. The two staff letters offer manage-
ment substantial additional flexibility in determining the contents
and format of the report, which may result in a more effective and
comprehensible, but less expensive, document. The staff's ration-
ale, logically extended, would also permit companies to dispense
altogether with the annual report to shareholders. Thus, both the
contents of the report and the need to send one in the first in-
stance will no longer depend upon the prescriptions of the proxy
rules but upon business and corporate communication
considerations.
Although representing a major advance, the staff position
raises concerns. Because this new format was announced in two
staff letters, the analysis represents the position of a single division
rather than that of the whole Commission.14 Indeed, the Commis-
12. The concept of a summary annual report has caused confusion. A normally in-
formed periodical like the Wall Street Journal inaccurately reported that "the summary
[annual] report must include a full profit-and-loss statement and balance sheet and a man-
agement analysis of major business risks and liabilities." Berton, Best Foot Forward, Wall
St. J., Sept. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 6. The statement is incorrect. The staff's two letters indicate
that the amount of financial information in a summary report is up to management, subject
only to the limits imposed by the antifraud provisions. See infra notes 163-246 and accom-
panying text.
13. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. Nothing in the Commission letters
indicates any conscious effort to resurrect, or even awareness of, the 1942 proposals.
14. See Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 Bus. LAw. 1019 (1987); see
also Professional Care Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,770, at 84,080 (Mar. 15, 1974) ("The staff responses in no-
action letters only purport to represent the views of the officials who gave them."). The use
of letters to espouse a novel interpretation of the proxy rules is somewhat of a surprise. As
practitioners know, revisions of the proxy rules are carried out annually. The SEC issues
releases to announce the revisions and normally avoids no-action letters for deviations. This
practice persists. For instance, the Commission has issued several recent releases proposing
amendments to, or adopting changes in, the proxy rules. See Amendments to Eliminate
Filing Requirements for Certain Preliminary Proxy Material; Amendments with Regard to
[Vol. 39:39
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sion has not formally reviewed the letters. Consequently, both let-
ters lack the force of rules adopted pursuant to the notice and
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act.15 The
Commission could, with little difficulty, reverse the staff's position.
Moreover, the staff could abruptly abandon its position with little
notice. The staff of the Division of Corporation Finance has itself
added to the uncertainty by deciding not to review further re-
quests in the area.16
The summary annual report also raises concerns under the
antifraud provisions. 17 In addition to Rule 1Ob-5, 18 summary an-
nual reports may be subject to Rule 14a-9, the antifraud provision
of the proxy rules."9 The reduced disclosure in summary annual
reports heightens the likelihood that a court will find the report
incomplete or misleading. Under such circumstances, the issuer
may need to rely on the fuller disclosure contained in other pub-
licly filed documents to avoid incurring liability for incomplete or
loose statements made in a summary annual report. Whether ac-
curate financial statements in the Form 10-K or the proxy state-
ment will fully compensate for abbreviated and arguably mislead-
ing disclosure in the summary annual report will depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, while holding sub-
stantial promise, use of the summary annual report likewise
presents substantial risk.
I. BACKGROUND
The proxy rules contemplate that once a year companies will
distribute an annual report to shareholders. Rule 14a-3(b) re-
quires the distribution of the report in advance of the annual
Rule 14a-8, Shareholders Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 25,217, [1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f 84,211 (Dec. 21, 1987); Proxy Rules -Amendments
to Conform to Comprehensive Proxy Revisions, Rules Providing for Modified or Super-
seded Documents, Exchange Act Release No. 24,514, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,130 (May 27, 1987); Facilitating Shareholder Communications, Ex-
change Act Release No. 24,274, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,113 (Mar. 27, 1987).
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1986).
16. Business Wire, June 1, 1987 ("Fearing an avalanche of requests for approval of
variants to the GM/McKesson approach that would distract the SEC's staff from other
possible business, the commission has since refused to review any further variations.").
17. See infra notes 193-236 and accompanying text.
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1988).
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meeting at which directors will be elected.2 0 The annual report
must be sent either prior to, or concurrently with, the proxy state-
ment. More than just a timing provision, Rule 14a-3(b) also
prescribes the content of the annual report. An annual report
must include, among other things, audited financial statements
and other financial information, management's discussion and
analysis of that information, a description of the company's busi-
ness industry segments, share price and dividend information, and
background information on all executive officers and directors.2
Typically, more than half of the document consists of required in-
formation.2 Rule 14a-3(b), therefore, ensures that shareholders
will have the full financial and narrative disclosure contained in
the annual report when executing a proxy.
A. Evolution of the Annual Report
The existing regulatory scheme for the annual report
emerged largely by accident, the result of successive revisions of
the proxy rules without a clear consideration of their fundamental
purposes. Commission regulation of annual reports arose in an ef-
fort to harmonize disparate disclosure regimes. Prior to adoption
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,23 corporations often dis-
tributed annual reports to shareholders. Some companies did so
pursuant to state law,24 while others did so in accordance with the
rules of the New York Stock Exchange.
The New York Stock Exchange began requesting reports in
1866.25 In 1895, listed companies were strongly urged to issue an-
nual earnings sheets and balance reports, with the urging becom-
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1988).
21. Id.
22. According to one study, elimination of the required financial information reduced
the annual report by about half. 1 S. GOLUB & J. KUEPPERS, SUMMARY REPORTING OF
FINANCIAL INFORMATION 1 (1983).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1986).
24. See Comment, Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-
1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 37 (1936).
The earlier provision [requiring] annual reports was continued [in the 1903 revi-
sions of the Massachusetts corporate code], but instead of leaving the form of
the report to be determined by the Commissioner, the new act provided for a
form of statement of assets and liabilities so lacking in detail that it was calcu-
lated to give little information as to the true state of the corporation's finances.
Id.; see also Note, Disclosure of Corporate Affairs, 47 HARV. L. REV. 335, 337-38
(1933)(states used "Blue Sky" laws and other corporate code provisions to require filing of
annual reports).
25. J. HURST, supra note 4, at 91.
[Vol. 39:39
SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT
ing a requirement five years later.2" The Exchange formally re-
quired distribution of annual reports to shareholders in 1909.7 Its
listing agreement explicitly stated that exchange traded companies
must:
publish at least once in each year and submit to stockholders, at
least fifteen days in advance of the annual meeting of the corpo-
ration, a statement of its physical and financial condition, an in-
come account covering the previous fiscal year, and a balance
sheet showing assets and liabilities at the end of the year; also
annually an income account and balance sheet of all constituent,
subsidiary, owned or controlled companies.28
Thus, at the time of the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934,29 the distribution of an annual report was a long-standing
and widespread practice, at least among exchange traded
companies.
The reports, however, often proved inadequate. Without uni-
form standards for financial reporting and other disclosures, an-
nual reports tended to obscure rather than elucidate. 3 Moreover,
26. 3. LIVINGSTON, AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 159 (1963). The NYSE sent letters to
listed companies requesting that they send "from time to time, as they may be issued, the
Reports of your Company. . .to the Secretary of the New York Stock Exchange." Id. at
157. The NYSE delisted one company in 1932 for failing to issue an annual report. Id. at
159.
27. J. HuRST, supra note 4, at 91.
28. H. MARTIN, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 271-72 (1919); see also Note,
supra note 24, at 336 n.13 (describing materials to be provided to shareholders under the
exchange rules). The annual report requirement meant that the shareholders would receive
current information only once a year. As early as 1913, Congress indicated the need for
more frequent disclosure. H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913).
[T]he objectionable features of operations on stock exchanges would be elimi-
nated. . .if such exchanges required corporations whose securities are listed by
them to file before the listing and thereafter at regular intervals, for public in-
spection, a verified statement showing item by item their assets and liabilities
and income and expenses, and for what their capital stock has been issued, stat-
ing how much for property and other considerations, with a description of such
property and considerations and a statement of any commissions paid to promot-
ers, brokers, middlemen, or vendors; a verified copy of statement of any contract,
whether in writing or parol, in any manner affecting the issue sought to be listed
or relating to any interest therein of promoters, bankers, middlemen, or vendors;
and a verified statement of any transactions, direct or indirect, between such
corporations and their officers and directors.
Id. at 117.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1986).
30. See W. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 156-207 (1927)(discussing the
inadequacies of corporate disclosure). See also Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47
HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1324 (1934)(noting that annual reports were "distinguished for
[their] vagueness and generality and for [their] capacity to conceal and suppress vital
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CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
even if accurate, the reports provided only a momentary snapshot
of a company's financial condition. Developments during the re-
mainder of the year went unreported.3 ' Additionally, shareholders
often received annual reports too late to be of any value in the
proxy solicitation process.
In adopting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,32 Congress
did nothing to disturb the existing reporting requirements. Indeed,
the Act conferred on the Commission no explicit authority to reg-
ulate the annual report to shareholders. Instead, Congress put in
place an additional, unrelated disclosure regime. Section 13(a)33
required the filing of periodic reports with the Commission. Con-
gress obviously expected the information to become available to
all interested parties.3 4 The provision ensured the availability of
financial information to the markets, but did not, explicitly or im-
plicitly, require distribution of the reports to shareholders. Section
14(a)35 gave the Commission regulatory authority over the proxy
process. While this section contemplates the distribution of infor-
mation to shareholders, it was intended to be limited to the proxy
process. Nowhere does the legislative history of Section 14 suggest
that other, unrelated documents should be distributed.3
facts"). The few states that required annual reporting provided minimal content regula-
tions. Comment, supra note 24. Nor have modern state statutes been any more effective.
See Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REv. 607 (1964).
A recent check of the corporation laws of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia reveals that twenty-two states have corporate reporting requirements
of one type or another. Of these, in only fourteen states are the reports available
to shareholders, and in three the requirement may be dispensed with by includ-
ing a contrary stipulation in the by-laws. Specific requirements of content for
reports are generally nonexistent, and only two states require certification by a
public accountant.
Id. at 625.
31. In 1926, only 242 of the 957 companies listed on the NYSE distributed quarterly
reports, while another 70 distributed reports semiannually. W. RIPLEY, supra note 30, at
187.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1986).
33. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)
(1986)).
34. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934)("Reports under this bill will
provide adequate information reasonably up to date as long as the security is traded on an
exchange.").
35. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1986)).
36. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). See also I L. Loss, SECuRrrlas REGULATION 348 (2d
ed. 1961)("Apart from the Holding Company and Investment Company Acts, the SEC
cannot directly regulate the reports sent to shareholders as distinct from those filed under
[Vol. 39:39
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Nevertheless, Section 14 ultimately proved to be the source of
the Commission's rulemaking authority to regulate annual reports.
This section granted the Commission almost unlimited authority
over the proxy process.37 A year after the adoption of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, the Commission adopted a rudimen-
tary set of proxy rules.38 The rules did little more than impose
minimal disclosure requirements and prohibit fraudulent prac-
tices.39 The Commission adopted the rules fully expecting that,
with experience, revisions would become necessary. In 1938 revi-
sions mandated distribution of a proxy statement and substantially
expanded the disclosure requirements.4 °
Through the 1938 revisions, the Commission seemed primar-
ily concerned with ensuring that shareholders had adequate infor-
mation to intelligently cast their votes on the specific issues
presented at shareholder meetings. Thereafter, the Commission
began to focus on the need to supply shareholders with general
financial information about the company, particularly when elect-
ing directors. This type of information enabled shareholders to
better evaluate the company's performance and, concomitantly,
the performance of its directors. Although the annual reporting
requirements of the NYSE did require disclosure of some finan-
cial information, the information was often inadequate and re-
ceived too late in the proxy process to be of any value.41' As the
the several statutes.").
37. "[T]he language of Section 14(a) is broad and quite clearly extends somewhat
beyond disclosure although how far is not at all clear." The Role of the Shareholder in the
Corporate World: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights
and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977)(state-
ment of Philip Loomis, Commissioner, SEC); see also Comment, Regulation of Proxy So-
licitation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 ILL L. REV. 914, 941 (1939)
("Under. . . the proxy rules. . . the Commission exercises a more far-reaching regulation
over the solicitation of proxies than is found in the disclosure requirements of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934.").
38. Exchange Act Release No. 378 (Class A)(Sept. 24, 1935).
39. See Proxy Rules: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 14 (1943) [hereinafter Proxy Hearings] ("[T]he
1935 rules were extremely rudimentary in nature. They merely prohibited falsehoods in
proxy solicitation. They did not govern what persons solicitating proxies should put in their
proxy statements.")(Statement of Mr. Purcell, Chairman, SEC).
40. Proxy Solicitations; Security Holder's Opportunity to Direct How Vote Shall Be
Cast, Exchange Act Release No. 1,823, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,151.43, at
24,151.52 (Aug. 11, 1938).
41. See Proxy Hearings, supra note 39, at 167 (statement of Mr. Purcell, Chairman,
SEC)("The Commission on this proposal was concerned with the fact that there was no
provision either in State laws or in the stock exchange rules which required an annual
1988-89]
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Chairman of the Commission explained:
Even under the old NYSE rules, the majority of corpora-
tions sent their annual reports voluntarily along with their proxy
soliciting material and some corporations sent their annual re-
ports before beginning the solicitation of proxies. However, there
were a number of companies who first sent out soliciting mate-
rial and obtained their proxies and then at a later date sent the
annual report to the shareholders. That, of course, resulted in
obtaining the reelection of the board of directors without telling
stockholders how their corporations had been operated during
the past year."2
To address this problem and ensure timely receipt of financial
information, the Commission opted for a clear, practical solution
all relevant financial information would be included in the
proxy statement.4 Shareholders would receive a single integrated
document with all the information - including financial -
needed to execute a proxy. Moreover, by requiring that financial
information be included in the proxy statement, the rationale for a
separate annual report evaporated. Not only would shareholders
receive all of the needed information in a single document, but
companies would no longer have to prepare a second document to
distribute to shareholders.
Given the obvious benefits of this solution, the Commission
expected its proposal to spell the demise of the annual report. In-
deed, the Commission ultimately expected the proxy statement,
Form 10-K, and the annual report to be collapsed -into a single
document. 4" The proposed rule, however, generated a deluge of
report containing financial statements to be sent to security holders before they executed
their proxies.").
42. Id. at 167-68.
43. Id. at 168.
44. According to the Commission:
It is anticipated that the proposal will result in considerable simplification and
consolidation of reports. At present many corporations are in the habit of pre-
paring three documents: (1) an annual report to stockholders; (2) a proxy state-
ment; and (3) an annual report to the Commission on Form 10-K. Under the
proposed rules it will be possible to merge the first two documents . . . . If the
proposal is finally adopted, the Commission will have an opportunity to permit
this document to be filed in lieu of most of the information presently called for
by Form 10-K. In that event the single document which is the annual report to
stockholders and the proxy statement can also be used as the 10-K report merely
by making a few additions in the form of exhibits or schedules. It is appreciated
that in some cases reasons of practical necessity will require the mailing of the
annual report in advance of the direct solicitation of proxies and the rules make
[Vol. 39:39
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criticism. 45 The rule would have resulted in the financial state-
ments becoming "filed" with the Commission, thereby raising the
specter of liability under Section 18.46 Not yet supplanted by Rule
lOb-5,'7 liability under this section seemed a real concern. Critics
claimed that subjecting the financial statements to Section 18 lia-
bility would harm shareholders by forcing companies to turn to
lawyers to draft the document, with technical precision taking
precedence over readability. As one critic concluded:
An increasing number of companies are producing reports
which laymen can read and understand and are thus encourag-
ing the interest of stockholders in corporate affairs. Should the
statutory liabilities be applied to the annual report, there is
great danger that corporate officials will be constrained to turn
the draftsmanship over to lawyers and technical men. What the
report gains in technical compliance with rules, it will lose in
readability. Should it thus become a dry and legalistic docu-
ment, the revision will have impaired the very purpose which is
ascribed to it. It would be far better to permit and encourage
the natural evolution which corporate reports are now
undergoing.48
The criticism had its intended effect. In adopting its final
rules, the Commission abandoned the single document concept.
Instead, the rules required companies to send annual reports to
shareholders prior to, or concurrently with, the proxy statement.' 9
provision for such a procedure. However, it is expected that in most cases the
single document can be used.
Id. The Commission distributed about 4,500 copies of the proposed rules and received over
500 written comments.
45. Id. at 142-43 (statement of Mr. Purcell, Chairman, SEC)(noting objections
lodged by corporate, exchange, and investment banking representatives); See also id. at
150 & 154-55.
46. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78r
(1986)). Section 18 provides a cause of action for fraudulent statements in documents
"filed" with the Commission.
47. Rule 1Ob-5 was adopted in May 1942, only a few months before implementation
of final rules regulating the annual report. Exchange Act Release No. 3,230 (May 21,
1942), 7 Fed. Reg. 3804. The current version of rule lOb-5 is contained in 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1988). The rule's potential as a device for recovery by private plaintiffs did not
begin to become apparent until several years later. See generally Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457, 457-58 (D. Del. 1947)(court noted that an individual right of
action for damages from § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violations was first recognized in Harden
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
48. Proxy Hearings, supra note 39, at 150 (letter sent to Mr. Purcell from various
corporate officers and partners offered into the committee record).
49. As the Rule provided:
(b) If the solicitation is made by the management of the issuer and relates to a
1988-891
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The rules represented little more than a timing provision5" and did
not purport to regulate the content of the report.51 Although a
copy had to be sent to the Commission, the annual report was not
deemed "filed" for purposes of Section 18.52 As the then Chair-
man of the Commission explained:
The new rules prohibit this practice and make sure that the
stockholder has been supplied with the annual report when he is
asked to execute his proxy. The new rules regulate only the time
when the annual report is sent. They do not say what must go
into the report except that it must contain financial statements
meeting of security holders at which the election of directors is an item of busi-
ness, an annual report to security holders containing such financial statements
for the last fiscal year as will, in the opinion of the management, adequately
reflect the position and operations of the issuer. Such annual report to security
holders, including financial statements, shall be in any form deemed suitable by
the management. If such annual report is sent to security holders in advance of
the proxy statement and form of proxy, it shall contain a statement in a promi-
nent place that proxies will be requested at a later time, indicating the approxi-
mate date on which the proxy statement is expected to be sent to security hold-
ers. In such case the proxy statement shall contain a statement in a prominent
place that an annual report to security holders, including financial statements,
has been previously sent to security holders, indicating the date on which it was
sent. Solely for the Commission's purposes in checking compliance with this rule,
three copies of any such annual report to security holders which is not filed
under § 240.14a-4(b) [Rule X-14A-4(b)] because it is to be sent out in advance
of the proxy statement shall be mailed to the Commission for its information not
later than the date on which such report is first sent or given to security holders.
Rule 14a-l(b), 7 Fed. Reg. 10,655 (Dec. 22, 1942) (current version of rule at 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-l(b) (1988)). The Commission adopted the amendment in Exchange Act Release
No. 3349 (Dec. 15, 1942).
50. Even the timing requirement imposed few additional burdens. In the proxy solici-
tation process, companies often asked shareholders to approve the annual report. See gener-
ally Opinion of General Counsel Regarding Texts of Proxy Solicitations in Certain In-
stances; Acknowledgment by Commission of Receipt of Material, Exchange Act Release
No. 461 (Jan. 21, 1936). As a result, the annual report had to be received before the proxy
materials.
51. In a hearing shortly after adoption of the 1942 revisions to the proxy rules, Con-
gressman Wolverton expressly asked whether the Commission had "any supervision of the
contents" of the annual report. Commission Chairman Purcell responded: "None whatso-
ever." Proxy Hearings, supra note 39, at 21.
52. Letter of Director of Corporation Finance Division Regarding Status of Annual
Reports Included With Proxies as Part of Proxy Solicitation Material, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 3,380, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,082 (Feb. 5, 1943) (opinion of Director
of Division of Corporation Finance that annual report is not a filed document). The modern
rule adheres to this same principle. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1988). But see infra note 55
and accompanying text. The courts have also acknowledged the special, unfiled status of
the annual report. See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 903 (1969). In addition, the Heit court rejected the argument that filing the
annual report with an exchange subjected the document to Section 18 liability. Id. at 915.
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in any form deemed proper by the management. As you will
remember, the requirement as to financial statements is largely
a duplication of the existing stock exchange requirements. The
change which we made involves no additional work on the part
of the corporation. It merely prescribes a time schedule they
must follow. To most corporations this involves no change at all.
In some instances it has required a postponement of the date of
the annual meeting for a few weeks' time at the most. This is a
small price to pay for insuring stockholders receive information
before rather than after they act."3
Critics gained at best a pyrrhic victory. Although limited in
scope, the rules began a gradual process of increased regulation
over the form and content of the annual report. Initially concerned
only with the timing of the report's distribution, the Commission
gradually and incrementally subjected the annual report to
greater regulation. Content ultimately ceased to be sacrosanct,
with the promulgation of Rule 14a-3 requiring the disclosure of
substantial information.5' At the same time, the importance of
53. Proxy Hearings, supra note 39, at 168 (statement of Mr. Purcell, Chairman,
SEC). The failure of the Commission to regulate the content of the document often left
shareholders with annual reports which contained markedly different financial statements
from those filed with the Commission. See Kaplan & Reaugh, Accounting, Reports to
Stockholders, and the SEC, 48 YALE LJ. 935 (1939).
A study of balance sheets and income statements appearing in the 1930 and
1937 published reports of seventy large corporations, herein presented, indicates
that, despite a marked improvement since 1930, such reports fall considerably
below the accounting standards which the same corporation is required to meet
in its reports to the SEC and to the exchange on which its securities are
registered.
Id. at 938.
Although shareholders could obtain copies of reports from the Commission, the process
presented difficulties. Id. at 937 ("[The] cost [of duplicating reports] is likely to be prohibi-
tive and the effort to obtain it is so great that only the most self-conscious investor will
bestir himself.") Of course, differences in financial statements, distributed to shareholders
and filed with the Commission, could give rise to an action for fraud.
54. See Amendment of Reg. § 240.14a-3 and Form 8-A, Exchange Act Release No.
7,508, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,187 (Jan. 15, 1965)(re-
quiring annual report to include discussion of issuer's business); Adoption of Amendment
of Rule 14a-3, Exchange Act Release No. 7,324, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 76,999 (May 26, 1964)(requiring annual reports to include consolidated
financial statements); SEC Interpretation of Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
7,078, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,103 (May 15, 1963)[hereinafter Exchange Act
Release No. 7,078](requiring disclosure in annual report of financial statements of any
significant subsidiary). See also Notice of Proposed Amendment to Form 10-K, Exchange
Act Release No. 9,576, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 78,727
(Apr. 20, 1972)(requiring registrants to file with the SEC an itemized list of information
which is not included in the registrant's annual report to its shareholders); Kant, The New
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avoiding Section 18 liability receded as the Rule lOb-5 era flow-
ered. Finally, even absolution from liability under Section 18
ceased, as portions of the annual report became "filed" for pur-
poses of the section.55
Commission regulation of the annual report might have been
of little moment for issuers already producing the document in
conformity with the listing requirements of the NYSE. In 1964,
however, Congress amended the Exchange Act to subject issuers
in the over-the-counter markets to the periodic reporting require-
ments and the proxy rules.56 For the first time, these issuers be-
came obligated to produce and distribute an annual report to
shareholders. Annual reporting requirements were thereby ex-
tended to a large class of issuers not already required to issue an
annual report by the rules of a self-regulatory organization.
B. Regulation
The annual report largely survived as an unregulated docu-
ment until the mid-1970s. Although they imposed certain minimal
disclosure requirements, the proxy rules essentially continued to
regulate only the timing of the document's distribution.57 Control
over the contents of the report remained in the hands of manage-
ment. As a result, management could, and often did, vary the fi-
nancial disclosure contained in the annual report to shareholders
from that contained in the annual report filed on Form 10-K.58
Annual Report to Shareholders, 20 VILL. L. REV. 273, 277-91 (1974-75)(discussing other
requirements imposed by the SEC).
55. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(d) (1988)("When filed as the annual report on Form
10-K, responses to the Items of that form are subject to Section 18 .... "); see also 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 1 (f) (1988)("[T]hree copies of any portion of the annual report referred
to in § 240.14a-3(b) which comments upon or refers to any solicitation subject to this
section, or to any participant in any such solicitation . . . shall be filed with the Commis-
sion as proxy material. ... ). One commentator, however, described Section 18 as a
"toothless tiger." Sommer, The Annual Report: A Prime Disclosure Document, 1972
DUKE L.J. 1093, 1102 n.52.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1986).
57. Prior to 1974, the Commission only required certain financial information in the
annual report. See, e.g., Atlantic Research Corp., Findings and Opinion of the Commis-
sion, Securities Act Release No. 4,657, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 76,949 (Dec. 6, 1963) (requiring consolidated financial statements in annual re-
port to shareholders under certain circumstances); Extension of Time for Submitting Com-
ments on Proposed Amendments to Proxy Rules and Information Rules: Adoption of
Amendments to Certain Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 8,029, [1966-1967 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,427 (Jan. 24, 1967)(amending Rule 14a-3 to re-
quire two years of financial statements in annual report to shareholders).
58. See General Revision of Regulation S-X, Exchange Act Release No. 16,498,
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The demise of the unregulated annual report can be traced to
two separate Commission rule-making endeavors. In the mid-
1970s, the Commission became concerned that while the annual
report was widely distributed it was generally unilluminating. To
make the document more informative, the Commission substan-
tially increased the amount of disclosure required in the annual
report. Nevertheless, the disclosure remained shorter and less ob-
lique than that required in Form 10-K. With the advent of inte-
grated disclosure a few years later, however, the Commission
largely conformed the disclosure requirements in the annual re-
port to those of Form 10-K. With the changes, the annual report
to shareholders became fully regulated.
Spurred by the findings of a special study, the Commission in
1974 drastically expanded the level of disclosure required in the
annual report.59 Noting the need for "meaningful information
about the company,"60 Rule 14a-3 was amended to require inclu-
sion of certified financial statements, a summary of operations,
management's analysis, a description of the issuer's business, iden-
tification of officers and directors, and market information about
the company's stock.6' Since the same information had to be in-
cluded in Form 10-K, the 1974 changes encouraged issuers to use
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (P) 82,424, at 82,786-87 (Jan. 15,
1980).
59. Proposed Amendments to Rules 14a-3 and 14c-3 under the Exchange Act to
Improve Disclosure in Annual Reports and to Improve Dissemination of Annual Reports;
Adoption of Amendments to Item 7 of Schedule 14A under the Exchange Act, Exchange
Act Release No. 10,591, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,619
(Jan. 10, 1974)[hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. .10,591]. An advisory committee
had recommended the stepped-up requirements. Report of the Industrial Issuers Advisory
Committee to the Securities and Exchange Commission, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,149 (Dec. 22, 1972).
60. Exchange Act Release No. 10,591, supra note 59, at 83,658.
61. Notice of Adoption of Amendments of Rules 14a-3, 14c-3 and 14c-7 under the
Exchange Act to Improve Disclosure in, and the Dissemination of, Annual Reports to Se-
curity Holders and to Improve the Dissemination of Annual Reports on Form 10-K or 12-
K Filed with the Commission Under the Exchange Act, Exchange Act Release No. 11,079,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,996 (Oct. 31, 1974)[hereinaf-
ter Exchange Act Release No. 11,079]("The Commission believes it is in the public inter-
est that all security holders be provided with meaningful information regarding the busi-
ness management, operations and financial operations position of the issuer and that the
annual report to security holders is the most suitable vehicle presently available for provid-
ing this information."). See also Exchange Act Release No. 10,591, supra note 59, at
83,659 ("The Commission is of the opinion that this information, and other specified infor-
mation discussed above should be included in all annual reports because such information
is important to a security holder's understanding and evaluation of the management for
whom he is being asked to vote and of his investments.").
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identical disclosure statements in the two documents. 2
Following the 1974 changes, issuers confronted the task of
producing two separate, heavily regulated reports: the annual re-
port to shareholders and Form 10-K. This increased imposition
forced the Commission to again rethink the disclosure process.
Based on recommendations of an advisory panel,63 the Commis-
sion allowed companies to use Form 10-K to fulfill both the peri-
odic reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the annual report requirement of the proxy rules.6 4
A single document, it was believed, would substantially re-
duce the disclosure burdens imposed on issuers. The single docu-
ment approach, however, proved unsuccessful. The notion of send-
ing shareholders a repackaged Form 10-K, with all of its leaden
lawyerly language proved unpopular. According to one report, be-
tween 1977 and 1979, only five companies used the integrated
form.6"
The Commission, nevertheless, continued to meld the disclos-
ure in the two documents.6 6 Quarterly stock prices became re-
quired in 1976,67 followed by segment data a year later.6 8 Both
documents became subject to Regulation S-K,6 9 the uniform set of
instructions for filings under the Securities Act of 193370 and the
62. Nevertheless, the disclosure required in the two documents was not identical. See
Exchange Act Release No. 11,079, supra note 61, at 84,569 (noting that while the annual
report required a brief description of the business, the document did not have to include the
"detailed information called for" in Form 10-K).
63. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., RE-
PORT TO THE SEC (Comm. Print 1977).
64. Guide 4, Integrated Reports to Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 13,639
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,214 (June 17, 1977); see also
Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations and Guides; In-
tegration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 17,114, [Ac-
counting Series Releases 1937-1982] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,301 (Sept. 2,
1980) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 17,114]("[T]he four-part Form 10-K system
has been designed to encourage, but not to require, the combination of annual reports and
Form 10-K's into one document.").
65. Folding 10-K's Into Annual Reports, Bus. WEEK, May 12, 1980, at 38.
66. Exchange Act Release No. 17,114, supra note 64.
67. Meyer, Annual Reports Get an Editor in Washington, FORTUNE, May 7, 1979,
at 212.
68. Adoption of Disclosure Regulation and Amendments of Disclosure Forms and
Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 14,306 [1937-82 Accounting Series Releases] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,258 (Dec. 23, 1977). The changes also increased the length of the
report. See An Open-Door Policy for Annual Reports, Bus. WEEK, May 12, 1975, at 48
(noting that segment data increases reports by an average of four pages).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 1229 (1988).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1986).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11 The unabashed goal was uni-
formity and standardization:
The Commission continues to believe that all security holders
should be provided with meaningful information and that the
changes in the Form 10-K requirements on which the annual
report to security holder requirements were based should also be
made in the annual report because of the importance of the dis-
closure. This results in a uniformity of the minimum disclosure
package in the annual report to security holders and in Form
10-K. This uniformity has been achieved by adopting uniform
financial statement requirements, by amending Regulation S-X,
by adopting new provisions in Regulation S-K and by adopting
several changes in Rules 14a-3 and 14c-3. The equivalency of
the minimum disclosure package in both documents not only
satisfies shareholder and investor needs, it should also avoid du-
plication by allowing issuers to use the disclosure in the annual
report to security holders to satisfy some of the requirements of
Form 10-K and, if they choose, when selling securities to the
public. 2
The Commission tempered the new requirements by permitting is-
suers to incorporate by reference the disclosure from the annual
report into Form 10-K. 3
With these changes, the content of the annual report and
Form 10-K moved in lock-step.74 A change in Regulation S-K af-
fected both documents. These increased reporting requirements
failed, however, to reflect the unique goals of the annual report to
shareholders.
By casting aside the concept of a single, integrated proxy
statement in the 1940s, the Commission set in stone the inefficient
process of three separate documents - an annual report to share-
holders, a proxy statement, and a Form 10-K. For over forty
years, the scheme was not seriously questioned. The system re-
mained intact even after the principal concern of commentators
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1986).
72. Exchange Act Release No. 17,114, supra note 64, at 62,809.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1988).
74. The Commission made the lock-step approach official in 1980. See supra text
accompanying note 72. Moreover, the process continues. See Report of Management's Re-
sponsibilities, Exchange Act Release No. 25,925, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
84,302 (July 19, 1988)("The SEC proposes to require that companies include a report of
management's responsibilities in Forms 10-K and N-SAR and annual reports to
shareholders.").
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opposing the "single document" approach ceased to be valid. 5
The tendency toward increased regulation of the form and
substance of the annual report lost sight of the entire purpose of
the report in the proxy process. The Commission's original goal
had only been to ensure that shareholders had the financial infor-
mation available in the annual report when executing their prox-
ies. The annual report, however, took on an independent existence
in the proxy process. Successive Commission actions resulted in
pervasive regulation of the annual report rather than simply pre-
scribing the narrative and financial information essential to the
proxy solicitation process. The net effect of this increased regula-
tory encroachment was to deny management the flexibility to de-
termine the appropriate format for communicating information to
its shareholders.
II. THE SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT
Few would deny the importance of the annual report as a
means for communicating with shareholders. As the Commission
has noted: The "annual report to security holders is one of the
most widely read disclosure documents, and potentially the best
suited for communicating information in an informative, readable
and understandable form to security holders and potential inves-
tors." Although widely distributed and packed with information,
the effectiveness of the annual report has been unclear. For one
thing, shareholders by and large do not read it."
This ineffectiveness may in part be explained by regulatory
constraints. The proxy rules recite that "the report may be in any
75. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
76. Exchange Act Release No. 10,591, supra note 59, at 83,658; see also Exchange
Act Release No. 11,079, supra note 61, at 84,568 ("The annual report to security holders
has long been recognized as the most effective means of communication between manage-
ment and security holders."). Annual reports might even impact the market for corporate
control. Reports can be drafted with the knowledge that they will be read cover to cover by
target companies. In at least one instance, a report portraying a bidder as a congenial place
for scientists to work apparently helped encourage high tech targets not to oppose an acqui-
sition attempt. Meyer, supra note 67, at 210.
77. See Foy, Annual Reports Don't Have to be Dull, 51 HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1973, at 49, 49 (study concluding that "40% of the stockholders surveyed give the [an-
nual] reports five minutes or less and 15% don't read them at all"); Callvert, Annual
Report -for Stockholders, the Stock Exchanges and the SEC, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Jan. 1965,
at 11, 12 (readership survey showing that 37% of the recipients do not read or even look at
the annual report). Even if read, little time is typically spent with the report. See Berg,
Reports Thrive in a Frugal Age, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1988, at D5, col. 4 (noting that the
average investor spends six minutes reading the annual report).
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form deemed suitable by management."" s In fact, the rules so pre-
scribe the form and content of the annual report that they severely
curtail management's flexibility in drafting and formatting the
document.79 The added disclosure also makes the annual meeting
process more expensive. Each extra page of disclosure increases
the cost of producing the report and mailing it to shareholders.80
The benefits of the required disclosure often do not outweigh the
added costs and the loss of drafting flexibility.81
No-action letters during the 1970s indicate the degree to
which practitioners felt constrained in drafting and formatting an-
nual reports. Letters sought advice on the print size of the notes to
the financial statements, 2 the ability to include advertisements, a
78. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(1 1) (1988). The Commission has emphasized the non-
technical nature of the annual report. Exchange Act Release No. 11,079, supra note 61, at
84,568 ("Such reports are readable because they generally avoid legalistic and technical
terminology and present information in an understandable, and often innovative, form.").
The detailed disclosure requirements of Rule 14a-3(b) seem inconsistent with the often
stated goal of simplicity and flexibility. Not only must an annual report include substantial
information, but the proxy rules to some degree regulate the type of paper used and the
size of the print. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(2) (1988); see also Wall Street Growth Fund,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 13, 1972)(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)(noting
that semi-annual reports for investment companies must be printed in 10 point type and
further specifying where certain items of information are to be located within the report).
But see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(12) (1988)("[T]he annual report to security holders of
[investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940] may be in
any form deemed suitable by management."). Finally, the rules "encourage" certain meth-
ods of presenting information. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(1 1) note (1988) ("Registrants
are encouraged to utilize tables, schedules, charts, and graphic illustrations of present fi-
nancial information in an understandable manner."). In view of the foregoing, management
has at best modest flexibility in drafting annual reports.
79. The extensive regulation of the annual report to shareholders reached a zenith of
sorts in the late 1970's when the Commission brought the document into the integrated
disclosure process. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text. Prior to this time, com-
panies retained a significant amount of flexibility over the contents of the annual report.
Indeed, studies indicated that the contents of annual reports and Form 10-Ks, including the
financial statements, diverged considerably. See Singhvi, Disclosure to Whom?, 41 J. Bus.
347, 351 (1968).
80. See infra notes 86, 96, 113 and accompanying text.
81. In addressing this problem, the Commission has observed that "increasing the
amount of required disclosure in annual security holder reports involves a risk that reada-
bility may be impaired." Exchange Act Release No. 17,114, supra note 64, at 62,809. To
prevent adverse consequences, the Commission promised "to monitor the situation." Id.
More recently, the Commission questioned the effectiveness of some aspects of the existing
disclosure regime. See Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Fi-
nancial Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6,711, [1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,118, at 88,627 (Apr. 20, 1987).
82. See Wall Street Growth Fund, Inc., supra note 78 (annual report of an invest-
ment company).
83. Berger Nechamkin & Associates, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (July 9,
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
and whether financial statements could be placed in a pocket
part." Most of the letters raised issues, the resolution of which
seemed clear under the rules. The letters reflected an attitude that
annual reports were fully regulated, with variations from the norm
requiring approval from the Commission staff.
The dearth of interest in reports generated some unusual, and
often expensive, efforts to grab the attention of shareholders.
Glossy reports came into vogue in the 1950s. 5 In 1964, Litton
Industries commissioned Andrew Wyeth to create a painting for
its report cover.86 More recently, reports have been scented with
the smell of spices,87 included pop-ups of corporate headquar-
ters,8 8 software,89 and individual pictures of more than 3,000 em-
ployees,90 in addition to a host of novel cover designs. 1
The problems associated with annual reports did not go unno-
ticed in the private sector. In 1983, the firm of Deloitte, Haskins
& Sells prepared a study for the Financial Executives Research
Foundation on the use of abbreviated annual reports.92 As the
study explained:
1979)(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); see also Time Inc., SEC No-Action Letter
(Apr. 4, 1977)(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (permitting corporations to publish quar-
terly reports in magazines). Gulf & Western reprinted its 1978 Annual Report in Time
Magazine at a cost of $5 million. Meyer, supra note 67, at 210.
84. Fletcher Mayo Associates, SEC No-Action Letter, [1975 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,394 (Oct. 1, 1975); see also Crossman-Thaddeaus Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter (Nov. 24, 1976)(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)(taking the position
that annual report can include trading information not required by Rule 14a-3).
85. Meyer, supra note 67, at 212.
86. Id.
87. See Byrne, This Year's Annual Reports: Show Business as Usual, Bus. WEEK,
Apr. 13, 1987, at 42 (noting that McCormick & Co., a spice maker, has used scents in its
annual report since 1977).
88. Id. (noting that Genetech's 1987 Annual Report contained a pop-up of the com-
pany's headquarters).
89. See The Hyper Card Supplement, PERS. COMPUTING, April 1988, at 40.
90. Byrne, Annual Reports: The Good, the Bad, and the Ridiculous, Bus. WEEK,
Apr. 7, 1986, at 40 (noting that Herman Miller, Inc.'s 1985 annual report contained one
and one-half inch pictures of all 3,265 employees).
91. See Berton, The Gallery: Annual Reports as Art, Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1988, at
20, col. 1.
The reports of Domino's Pizza Inc. for 1982, 1984 and 1985 used round finan-
cial statements shaped like a pizza, an actual domino game in a wooden box and
a newsboy's canvas bag. Musical instrument maker Norlin Corp.'s 1974 annual
report is a record jacket containing an LP album 'Music in America.' And Red
Owl Stores Inc.'s 1970 report resembles a brown paper shopping bag with an
attached register receipt for $30.31.
Id.
92. 1 S. GOLUB & J. KUEPPERS, supra note 22.
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Financial statements, footnotes and supplementary disclosures,
in becoming more voluminous, have become too complex and
perhaps too intimidating for the average reader. And, to make
all statements technically correct, footnotes and other disclo-
sures are often written in a style and a vocabulary that only
accountants and attorneys can readily understand.
Surveys have shown that five to fifteen minutes is as much
time as the average reader spends on an annual report. This sug-
gests that the average reader can digest only a fraction of the
information in these lengthy documents and may rely mostly on
the highlighted information. So, we have information overload,
and it has denied the average reader of annual reports the very
benefits that the new disclosure requirements are intended to
offer . 3
As part of the study, nineteen companies prepared both con-
ventional annual reports and summary reports.9 After examining
the documents, the Deloitte study ventured a number of conclu-
sions. First, summary annual reports were substantially shorter
than conventional reports, with the number of pages of financial
disclosure decreased from an average of twenty-four to eleven (a
fifty-four percent reduction). 5 The page reduction was generated
primarily through the use of condensed information on balance
sheets, eliminating or shortening footnotes, reducing the segment
data, and eliminating the report of the independent accountants.
The summary annual report also tended to be easier to read. "The
summary reports were believed to be more readable than the con-
ventional annual reports from which they were derived. They were
shorter. More importantly, the companies focused on effective
communication of information in laymen's language, without the
constraints imposed by all the technical disclosures required under
the present system." 96
The Deloitte study, however, contemplated the use of a sum-
93. Id. at 1-2.
94. Id. at 1.
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id. Others sought to reduce duplication by combining into a single document the
annual report to shareholders and the Form 10-K. The SEC approved this procedure. Ter-
adyne, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 11, 1973)(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
Nevertheless, this approach proved impractical for most issuers. By including all of the
information required by Rule 14a-3(b) and Rule 13a-I in a single document, shareholders
received an even longer annual report. In addition to likely increases in postage and pro-
duction costs, a longer annual report was not necessarily a more effective document. See
supra notes 77-78.
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mary annual report in place of the existing annual report. The
study, therefore, proposed reduced disclosure to shareholders, a
proposition unlikely to persuade an agency that had always viewed
its principal goal as increasing the amount of available informa-
tion. Predictably, the Commission indicated unhappiness with the
summary annual report notion and nothing came of the study.9"
The issue lay dormant for several years. In 1986, General
Motors Corporation (GM) reopened the matter and again ad-
vanced the concept of a summary annual report. General Motors
had incentive. Rationalizing the disclosure process would reduce
the cost of the annual meeting process. With a substantial number
of record owners, GM had to print large quantities of annual re-
ports for distribution to shareholders and investors. Every page of
glossy paper eliminated from the report reduced costs.9"
Perhaps aware of the Commission's prior opposition to the
summary annual report, GM did not propose the abbreviated re-
port as a substitute for, but as an addition to, the disclosure re-
quired in Rule 14a-3. General Motors suggested that the proxy
statement include as an appendix all information required in Part
II of Form 10-K, including audited financial statements and man-
agement's discussion and analysis.9 9 Shareholders electing direc-
tors would, therefore, receive all necessary information in a single
document.
With all the necessary information in the proxy statement,
GM posited that the annual report to shareholders "could be
dropped entirely." 100 Nonetheless, the company acknowledged
97. See Business Combination Transactions - Adoption of Registration Form, Ex-
change Act Release No. 21,982, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 72,418, (Apr. 23,
1985)("The Commission has not sanctioned in this proceeding any revision of the basic
information package, such as summary annual reports to security holders.").
98. The average 1987 annual report costs $3.00, up from $2.85 the year before. A
five billion dollar industry, annual report costs for publicly traded companies average
$463,000. Berg, supra note 77, at D5, col. 1. Although dated, one article indicated that, in
1963, AT&T distributed 3.2 million copies of its annual report. Callvert, supra note 77, at
12. According to the article, AT&T needed 2.28 million reports for record owners; 150,000
for street name accounts; 170,000 for "investment dealers, banks, trusts and brokers";
510,000 for distribution during the year to investors; and 90,000 for use by Bell subsidiar-
ies. Id. AT&T's needs increased to four million by 1985. Byrne, supra note 90, at 40.
Obviously, savings on postage and printing resulting from a thinner document can be sig-
nificant when such large quantities are involved. See infra text accompanying note 112.
99. General Motors Corp., supra note 11, at 77,311.
100. General Motors Corp., supra note 11, at 78,401. The Commission staff had
previously taken the position that financial statements did not have to be physically at-
tached to the annual report. See Fletcher/Mayo/Associates, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
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that the report had "value as a general communication me-
dium."' 1 The report would be sent to shareholders, but would
contain only financial highlights, a basic financial statement, other
key financial data deemed appropriate, an accountant's report,
and a narrative discussion of the financial information included. 102
Neither the Form 10-K nor the proxy statement would incorpo-
rate by reference any portion of the annual report to shareholders.
Since the proxy statement was to contain all of the required infor-
mation, including financial statements, GM was seeking to use the
same basic format proposed by the Commission in 1942.103
The suggested format met with staff approval. General Mo-
tors' "proposal provides a sound means to permit the free writing
desired in the company's glossy report while assuring that GM
shareholders receive, on a timely basis, all of the financial infor-
mation mandated by the Commission's proxy rules."'" 4 Approval,
however, came at a price. While not imposing conditions on the
use of summary reports, the staff's letter did reiterate the under-
takings agreed to by GM, including:
1. The release of the full audited financial statements with
the earnings press release, and extensive circulation of the re-
lease to the market;
2. The filing of the Form 10-K report with the Commission
at or prior to the release of the glossy report;
3. The proposed auditors' report on the financial informa-
tion with the financial data in the glossy report;
4. The inclusion of the full information required by Rule
14a-3(b) in both the Form 10-K and an appendix to the annual
election of directors proxy statement; and...
5. The undertaking in the glossy report, as well as the proxy
statement, to provide the Form 10-K upon request." 5
The staff also commented specifically on the reduced level of fi-
nancial disclosure in the summary report.
The extent to which General Motors includes summary fi-
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,394, at 86,051 (Oct. 1,
1975)(agreeing not to recommend enforcement action if financial statements "appear in a
'pocket part' inserted inside the back cover of the [annual] report"). The no-action letter
did not address whether the financial statements could be included in the proxy statements.
I01. General Motors Corp., supra note 11, at 77,311.
102. Id.
103. See supra text accompanying note 40.
104. General Motors Corp., supra note 11, at 77,311.
105. Id.
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nancial information in its glossy report, as with any corporate
communication not prescribed by the Commission's rules, is a
matter for the company's determination. As with all corporate
communications that can reasonably be expected to affect the
market for the corporation's securities, the glossy report includ-
ing the summary financial information is subject to the prescrip-
tions of [the antifraud provisions], l"'
Four months later, the staff issued a second letter on the
same subject. McKesson Corporation sought the staff's views on a
format similar to the one proposed by GM. Unlike GM, however,
McKesson did not propose to include in the summary annual re-
port an undertaking to provide a copy of the Form 10-K upon
request.107 The staff expressed no comment on the change. 08 In-
deed, as a wholly unregulated document, the summary annual re-
port is arguably not subject to any affirmative disclosure require-
ments, including the minimal and innocuous requirement that a
Form 10-K be provided on request. Otherwise, the McKesson let-
ter added no new insight on the staff's treatment of summary an-
nual reports. With the McKesson letter a door closed. Thereafter,
the staff declined to review further letters on the subject. 9
General Motors received the letter late in the proxy season
and did not distribute a summary annual report. McKesson did
distribute an abbreviated report. The report consisted of twenty-
four pages," °0 compared with forty pages the previous year."' The
document strongly resembled a conventional annual report in for-
mat and style but without certain data such as notes to the finan-
cial statements. According to published accounts, the use of the
summary annual report saved the company approximately
$110,000 in production and postage costs." 2 Despite the unique
nature of the report and the sensitive issues created by its use,
106. Id.
107. McKesson Corp., supra note 11.
108. Id.
109. Business Wire, June 1, 1987. Although no longer issuing additional letters, the
staff has apparently continued to refine its position. The Wall Street Journal reported that
the staff's position no longer required companies to release complete financial statements to
the public before distributing summary annual reports. Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1987, at 1,
col. 1. Advance distribution of the report, however, may raise concerns under the anti-
fraud provisions. See infra notes 163-246 and accompanying text.
110. McKEssoN CORP., 1987 ANNUAL REPORT (1987).
111. McKEssoN CORP., 1986 ANNUAL REPORT (1986).
112. Wax, Condensed Annual Report Planned, Philadelphia Inquirer, June 6, 1987,
at C13, col. 1.
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McKesson unnecessarily complicated the matter by failing to in-
clude in the proxy statement all of the information required by
Rule 14b-3(b).113
One year later, at least seven companies used the summary
format.114 Notwithstanding the objections of some analysts,115 the
abbreviated report proved popular with shareholders.", Moreover,
the documents continued to be thinner, thus generating apprecia-
113. See infra notes 153-57, and accompanying text.
114. Companies using a summary annual report during the 1987 proxy season in-
cluded: American Fructose Corp., AMERICAN FRUCTOSE CORP., SUMMARY ANNUAL RE-
PORT (1987); American Maize-Products Co., AMERICAN MAIZE-PRODUCTS CO., SUMMARY
ANNUAL REPORT (1987); Branch Corp., BRANCH CORP., 1987 ANNUAL REVIEW (1987);
Figgie Int'l Co., FIGGIE INT'L, 1987 SUMMARY REPORT (1987); Kroger Co., KROGER CO.,
1987 ANNUAL REPORT (1987); McKesson Corp., McKESSON CORP., McKESSON TODAY
(June 1988) (annual report issue); SPX Corp., SPX CORP., REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS
(1987). One commentator put the number of summary reports in 1988 at 13. See Cato,
When Preparing Annual Reports, Less Is Definitely Not More, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1988,
at 12, col. 3.
115. The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts has intimated concern for the
summary format.
The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts has not taken a position, nor has
it published any views, on the summary annual report format. However, our
sister organization, the Financial Analysts Federation, has discussed the matter
internally at appropriate committee levels and has shared its unofficial views
when asked. The FAF has not yet adopted an official statement on this subject.
As you are well aware, issuers argue that annual reports have become too
loaded with detail to be readable, that the typical individual investor is confused
by, and does not want, all the information currently presented in annual reports,
and that professional and sophisticated investors can obtain the information they
desire from sources other than the annual report, primarily the SEC filings. In
this regard, the FAF is concerned about investors' need for full disclosure at one
time under one cover, the lack of immediate accessibility of 10-K and proxy
statements, and problems with accessibility in that if full statements are in the
proxy, but with sections incorporated by reference to the 10-K. In short, our
concern with summary annual reports is one of timely and full disclosure in
easily accessible format.
Letter from Alfred C. Morley, President, Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts, to J.
Robert Brown, Jr. (Aug. 30, 1988). See also infra note 128. The summary report has also
engendered virulent opposition from Sid Cato, the publisher of a newsletter on annual re-
ports. Galant, The Wacky World ofSid Cato, INVESTOR RELATIONS, July 1988, at 2 (Cato
"detests summary annual reports . . . contending they do nothing but cheat shareholders
out of information."). Given that the full information is available in the annual report on
Form 10-K and the expanded proxy, the objection reduces to the complaint that these
documents are not always available simultaneously with the summary report and they re-
quire the extra step of writing to the company for a copy. Fisher, Shareholders Gave Rave
Review to Kroger's Summary Report, Cincinnati Bus. Courier, June 6, 1988, at 2, col 3.
116. Fisher, supra note 115. Receiving a positive reception, McKesson again used
the summary report format for the 1987 fiscal year. McKesson Announces Financial Re-
sults, Business Wire, May 25, 1988.
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ble cost savings." 7
III. ANALYSIS
Viewed in context with the historical purpose of the Commis-
sion's regulation of annual reports, the GM/McKesson letters are
unremarkable. The lengthened proxy statement and unregulated
annual report differed little from what the Commission had pro-
posed in 1942. Moreover, the GM/McKesson format was emi-
nently consistent with the underlying purpose behind Commission
regulation of annual reports. The Commission drew the report into
the regulatory scheme only to ensure that shareholders had access
to the type of financial and narrative information necessary for
the informed exercise of the corporate franchise, not out of con-
cern over the contents of annual reports per se. The GM proposal
ensured the availability of the information while returning format-
ting flexibility to management.
Arguably, GM did not need to obtain the Commission's con-
currence with the proposed format. The appendix to the proxy
statement met all of the disclosure requirements of Rule 14a-3(b).
Attachment to the proxy statement represented the only signifi-
cant difference between the GM appendix and a conventional an-
nual report - a distinction without a difference. Nothing in Rule
14a-3(b) prohibited a company from attaching the annual report
to the proxy statement. In fact, the rule suggests quite the oppo-
site. By requiring the report to precede or accompany the proxy
statement," 8 Commission rules seem to promote attachment of
the report to the proxy. General Motors probably should have la-
beled the appendix as the "annual report" and dispensed entirely
with the no-action request." 9
117. Kroger Co., for example, issued a 16 page Summary Report, down from 32 the
year before. Fisher, supra note 115. See also supra notes 98, 112, and infra note 130 and
accompanying text.
118. See supra note 4-9 and accompanying text.
119. This statement reflects the views of the authors. Because one of the authors is
currently employed at the Securities & Exchange Commission, mandatory review of the
article was required by Ethics Counsel at the agency. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.735 (1988). As
part of the review process, Ethics Counsel required language changes in five places in the
text and three in the footnotes to make clear that the views espoused in the article were
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Commission. Normally, this entailed
the addition of the phrase "in the authors' belief" at the beginning of each offending sen-
tence. While at least one author believes that the disclaimer in the first footnote sufficiently
alleviates any concern in this area, we have, out of expediency, nonetheless agreed to the
requested language changes. Rather than destroy the flow of the text with the cumbersome
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Since the requirements of Rule 14a-3 were satisfied by the
appendix, any abbreviated annual report would be an additional,
voluntary communication, wholly unregulated by the Commission.
Moreover, characterizing the appendix as the annual report would
yield an affirmative advantage,1"' because the financial statements
could be incorporated by reference into the report on Form 10-
K.12 1 Because GM and McKesson did not treat the appendix as
the annual report, they agreed to include complete financial infor-
mation in the proxy statement and the Form 10-K rather than
incorporate it by reference. The result was a certain amount of
unnecessary duplication.
Nevertheless, by endorsing the GM/McKesson proposals, the
staff has accelerated the demise of the heavily regulated, unthink-
ing, all-purpose, and often incomprehensible annual report. The
staff response also obviated a number of potential legal concerns.
For example, Section 14(b)122 gives the Commission rulemaking
authority to regulate the distribution of proxies, consents, and au-
thorizations by brokers and banks. The shareholder communica-
tion rules adopted under this section require brokers and banks to
forward proxy materials to beneficial owners.123 To the extent that
annual reports do not constitute proxy materials, the Commission
may not have the authority to require distribution by brokers or
banks. In apparent recognition of the limited scope of Section
14(b), the Commission does not require brokers and banks to dis-
tribute information statements to beneficial owners.124
Furthermore, this interpretation eliminates the legitimate
and repetitive phrase, however, the additional language was inserted in a footnote to each
sentence.
120. This statement reflects the views of the authors. See supra note 119.
121. See Instruction G to Form 10-K, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,638 (1980). In providing
interpretative advice, the staff has agreed with this position.
122. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(b) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
78n(b) (1986)).
123. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14b-1 & 240.14b-2 (1988). See also Brown, Shareholder
Communications and the Securities & Exchange Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory
Utility or Futility?, 13 J. CORP. L. 684 (1988)(discussing rules 14b-1 and 14b-2).
124. Under Rule 14c-7(a)(3), issuers must provide brokers and banks with copies of
information statements for distribution to beneficial owners. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-7(a)(3)
(1987). Rule 14b-l, however, only requires brokers to forward any "proxy, other proxy
soliciting material, and/or annual reports to security holders." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-l(b)
(1988). Information statements are not expressly mentioned. At least one commentator has
suggested that the Commission lacks the authority to force brokers and banks to distribute
information statements. Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Act Amend-
ments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706, 734.
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concern of some companies about untimely delivery of annual re-
ports. To reduce costs, issuers often split-mail, sending the proxy
statement by first class and the annual report by third.125 Under
Rule 14a-3, however, the annual report must arrive concurrently
with, or before, the proxy statement.126 Given the vagaries of the
postal system, mailing the annual report by third class mail raises
the specter of untimely receipt by shareholders. Moreover, the
Commission has resolutely refused to provide any safe harbor or
guidance on how to ensure timely receipt. 27 Allowing companies
to attach the relevant information to the proxy statement resolves
these timing problems.
In addition to alleviating certain legal uncertainties, the most
obvious advantage of the new regulatory regime is the heightened
flexibility accorded management in drafting annual reports. The
reasoning of the GM/McKesson letters provide issuers with three
broad choices in drafting annual reports: (1) distribution of a
standard, glossy annual report that conforms with all of the re-
quirements of Rule 14a-3(b); (2) distribution of a summary an-
nual report; or, (3) foregoing completely the distribution of an an-
nual report of any kind.
A. Standard Annual Report
A standard annual report containing all of the information
required by Rule 14a-3(b) arguably still offers advantages. Com-
panies may opt for the report under the theory that shareholders
are better off with an overabundance of information. Indeed, some
groups have objected to summarized financial information in an-
nual reports.128 A standard annual report also provides a degree of
125. Pease, Preparing for the Annual Meeting: The Pressures and Problems, 1 DEL
J. CORP. L. 302, 316 (1976)(of 733 companies surveyed, 328 sent annual reports by third
or fourth class bulk mail).
126. Ash v. GAF Corp., 723 F.2d 1090, 1091 (3d Cir. 1938). See also Exchange Act
Release No. 7,078, supra note 54 (noting that it would violate the proxy rules to send
proxy statements by first class mail while simultaneously sending annual reports by fourth
class mail).
127. Facilitating Shareholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No. 22,533,
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,930, at 87,875 (Oct. 15,
1985).
128. See supra note 115. See also HILL & KNOWLTON, INC., INVESTMENT ANA-
LYSTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORTS, A SURVEY 7 (May 1987)("Six-
teen of the 25 analysts surveyed - 64 percent - were against companies' publishing a
summary annual report."). The study, however, should perhaps be viewed with skepticism.
First, only a small number of analysts were questioned. Second, the study came out before
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comfort. The content requirements of Rule 14a-3(b) have become
familiar and the format of the annual report standard. Adhering
fully to the disclosure requirements of Rule 14a-3(b) enables
those drafting the report to avoid hard decisions about what infor-
mation should be included or excluded from the document.
The standard annual report also offers a significant practical
advantage over the summary report. With the contents largely
mandated, use of the conventional report reduces the likelihood
that a misleading document will be created and minimizes the risk
that the report will be subject to the antifraud provision contained
in the proxy rules.129 Thus, a full-blown standard report may alle-
viate some of the risk of a Commission enforcement action.
Of course, distributing a standard annual report does not ad-
dress the problems of unnecessary length and incomprehensibility
that the summary report seeks to correct. Accordingly, companies
which continue to issue standard annual reports may nevertheless
consider producing a supplemental summary report that can be
distributed as a promotional piece throughout the year.
B. Summary Report
Using a summary annual report offers immediate advantages.
Summary reports should generate cost savings.1l a Frequently, an-
nual reports are printed on heavy, glossy white paper. A shorter
report reduces both production and postage costs. An issuer could
simply reduce the size of the document, perhaps by eliminating
footnotes or segment reporting.131
McKesson actually distributed the first summary annual report. Finally, other commenta-
tors have adopted the contrary viewpoint. See Enhanced Proxy Statement Contains Au-
dited Financials, SORG SAYS, Aug. 1987, at 1 (noting that analysts who follow McKesson
have registered a "highly positive" response to the company's summary annual report).
129. See infra notes 193-236 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 98. The monetary savings must be balanced against several po-
tential disadvantages. One commentator identifies these disadvantages as: (1) the lack of a
14a-3 waiver; (2) the opposition of security analysts to the use of summary annual reports;
(3) the opportunity presented by the report format to hide bad news in the proxy statement
appendix; (4) the lack of SEC guidelines for the reports; (5) Generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) requirements limiting the auditor's certification to the condensed finan-
cial statements actually contained within the summary report; (6) the need, in most in-
stances, to use a communications professional in the preparation of the summary report;
and (7) the lack of available feedback concerning shareholder reaction to summary annual
reports. Dubin, Consideration of Use of a Summary (Non-Rule 14a-3) Annual Report, in
PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DocuMENTs 457, 464-65 (1988).
131. Ordinarily, issuers must disclose financial data about significant industry seg-
ments. Interpretations, Guidelines, and Administrative Determinations, Exchange Act Re-
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Focusing on the possibility of cost savings, however, repre-
sents too narrow a view of the advantages of a summary report.
Importantly, a summary report may result in more effective dis-
closure. As currently incarnated, the annual report suffers from
the need to serve too many masters. All shareholders receive the
same annual report, irrespective of their level of interest or sophis-
tication. 132 The result is a schizophrenic document, with an annual
report containing both a fluffy narrative that appeals to those
shareholders with limited interest in the company and a densely
packed, tightly drafted financial discussion that appeals to ana-
lysts, institutional shareholders, and other sophisticated investors.
With their newly found flexibility, management can draft a
summary annual report specifically designed for particular audi-
ences.3 For example, a relatively simple report might be drafted
for shareholders with small holdings. Those with holdings below a
predetermined threshold arguably have a reduced need for com-
prehensive information about the issuer. With fewer pages than
conventional annual reports and reduced financial disclosure, the
lease No. 14,523, [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
72,266 (Mar. 3, 1978). An industry segment is significant if it accounts for 10% or more
of the total revenues, profits or losses, or assets of the entire business. FINANCIAL AC-
COUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No.
14, at 15 (1988). An issuer with a large number of industry segments may simply decide
to report the information on a consolidated basis, without separate segment disclosure.
Eliminating footnotes represents another possibility. Of course, wholesale elimination of
footnotes may not always be appropriate. See Gubernick, See Footnote, FORBES, Sept. 24,
1984, at 160 (discussing the importance of information on bank standby letters of credit
contained in footnotes to annual reports).
132. Interestingly, the Commission has acknowledged the inability of many share-
holders to understand and analyze the complex information normally found in the Form
10-K. See Exchange Act Release No. 10,591, supra note 59, at 83,658 ("Form 10-K re-
ports, however, are of little direct value to the average security holder who do [sic] not
have such access and may not have the necessary background and experience to analyze
the contents."). Ironically, the Commission's solution has been to incorporate more infor-
mation from the Form 10-K into the annual report to shareholders. See Exchange Act
Release No. 11,079, supra note 61, at 84,568. ("Accordingly, the Commission has
amended Rules 14a-3 and 14c-3 to require that an annual report to security holders con-
tain a minimum quantum of meaningful business and financial information, most of which
is already required in the annual report on Form 10-K .... "). A more appropriate re-
sponse would have been to devise separate disclosure rules for the annual report designed to
meet the needs of the report's audience. The summary annual report affords the opportu-
nity for a more focused disclosure.
133. The Commission has noted the different informational needs of various catego-
ries of shareholders. See Exchange Act Release No. 17,114, supra note 64, at 62,808.
("The constituencies which have been the most frequent users of Form 10-K information,




simplified version could still be printed on expensive paper and
include an attractive color scheme. A second report with more de-
tail could be drafted to address the informational needs of sophis-
ticated investors and analysts. The report could be printed on less
expensive paper without all of the public relations flourishes in-
cluded in the version sent to ordinary shareholders. Of course,
companies could provide analysts with all the needed information
by simply giving them copies of the annual report on Form 10-K
and the proxy statement.""
The size of their holdings does not represent the only appro-
priate means of classifying shareholders. For some companies, ge-
ography may be an appropriate classification. Sizable numbers of
shareholders may reside in specific counties, states, or regions. A
summary annual report could be drafted in a way that emphasizes
a company's facilities or activities in the relevant geographic area.
Particularly for companies with a history of community involve-
ment, the summary annual report would enable that involvement
to be related to those most directly affected.
Any group of sufficient size may be ripe for a customized
summary annual report. Employees, first time investors, long time
investors, foreign shareholders, particular age groups, all represent
possible target groups. In each instance, the company could dis-
tribute a report that highlights issues or facilities of interest to the
particular shareholder group.
Different versions of the report would to some degree neutral-
ize the concerns voiced by critics who view the summary report as
a guise to reduce disclosure and obscure important develop-
ments."l 5 Not a new concern, 36 the need of analysts for complete
information need not overshadow the likewise legitimate informa-
134. The Commission has noted the importance of the Form 10-K to analysts. See
Exchange Act Release No. 10,591, supra note 59, at 83,658. ("[Tlhe detailed disclosure
required in annual reports on Form 10-K is of significant value to securities analysts.").
135. See supra notes 115, 128 and accompanying text.
136. See Annual Reports: More Candor, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1983, at 29, col. 3
("When it comes to delivering bad news, annual reports are usually a tribute to the art of
understatement."); Byrne, Curious About the Crash? Don't Read Your Annual Report,
Bus. WEEK, Apr. 11, 1988, at 66.
Proctor & Gamble Co. may get the prize for burying bad news in a bed of fluff.
Its annual, including a 24 page 150th anniversary booklet, dispenses with the
summary of financial results that leads off most annuals. Instead, readers must
wade through six paragraphs of good-looking numbers before finding the bomb:
an $805 million restructuring charge that cut net income by 54%.
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tional need of less sophisticated shareholders for an understanda-
ble report. Indeed, less complex summary annual reports have
been well received by shareholders.13 By sending a complete ver-
sion to analysts and sophisticated shareholders and a more reada-
ble report to other shareholders, each group will have their partic-
ular needs met.
A summary annual report may also be an ideal communica-
tion medium in certain special circumstances. The accounting
treatment of a merger is one area where a summary annual report
can be both more effective and more informative than a conven-
tional annual report. Some acquisitions must be treated as a
"pooling" of interests, rather than a purchase. Generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP), however, dictate that the pooling
cannot be given effect until after consummation of the merger."3 '
If consummated after the close of the fiscal year, the financial
statements in the annual report to shareholders cannot give effect
to the pooling but must instead contain the acquiring company's
financial statements.
As a practical matter, historical earnings of the acquiring
company may be of little value to shareholders and investors, and
even somewhat misleading. The acquisition may have been ap-
proved long before the end of the fiscal year, with the closing
delayed for regulatory or tax reasons. In the period preceding the
closing, the companies will often have been acting in concert, with
the process of combining operations already underway. Moreover,
if the transaction closes shortly after the first of the year, the two
companies will have been operating on a combined basis for sev-
eral months by the time shareholders receive the report. Under
these circumstances, shareholders would be better served by com-
bined financial statements of the acquiring and acquired company.
Under current accounting practices, an acquiring company
may only show the effect of the pooling in their financial state-
ments either through footnotes or the inclusion of both historical
and pooled financial statements.139 Disclosure in footnotes often
obscures rather than ellucidates the financial picture. Moreover,
including both historical and combined financial statements is not
a particularly appealing solution. In addition to the attendant con-
137. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
138. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES BOARD Op. No. 16, at 61 (1988).
139. See, e.g., PNC FINANCIAL CORP., 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 26 (1988).
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fusion associated with two sets of financial statements, the addi-
tional disclosure will increase the length and cost of the report.
The summary annual report format presents a neat solu-
tion.140 Financial statements of the acquiring company could be
included in the appendix to the proxy statement and the Form 10-
K. Once this is done, management has almost unlimited discretion
in determining the contents of the summary report. The summary
annual report could, therefore, include the companies' combined
financial statements, while leaving out the historical statements.
This format would allow issuers to provide the marketplace with
increased financial information in a manner more useful to
shareholders.141
An example of the utility of this format, in practice, can be
gleaned from a comparison of the 1987 annual reports issued by
Meridian Bancorp, Inc.' 42 and PNC Financial Corp.143 The hold-
ing companies of both banks executed agreements to acquire other
financial institutions in 1987. Both elected to account for the ac-
quisition as a pooling of interests rather than a purchase and both
consummated the transaction in early 1988. 44 Because of the
closing dates, the annual reports had to include historical financial
statements.
In conformity with accounting literature, PNC dutifully is-
sued an annual report containing both combined and historical fi-
nancial statements. Financial disclosure consumed sixty-eight
pages of the ninety-six page behemoth, or more than seventy per-
140. This statement reflects the views of the authors. See supra note 119.
141. Indeed, financial statements utilized in summary reports need not conform to
Regulation S-X. See Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1988). In years past the Commis-
sion did not regulate the contents of annual reports. Thus, issuers sometimes used different
financial statements in the annual report and the Form 10-K. See In re Atlantic Research
Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 4,657, [1963 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 76,949 (Dec. 6, 1963)(permitting use of financial statements in Form 10-K which differ
from those used in the annual report). With the summary annual report no longer regu-
lated, the financial statements need not duplicate those appearing in the Form 10-K or
appendix to the proxy statement. Of course, the financial statements in the summary an-
nual report may not be misleading. See infra notes 163-246 and accompanying text.
142. MERIDAN BANCORP INC., MERIDAN 1987 ANNUAL REPORT (1988).
143. PNC FINANCIAL CORP, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT (1988).
144. Meridian entered into an agreement to acquire Delaware Trust Company in
May 1987. MERIDIAN BANCORP INC., supra note 142, at 2. The transaction closed on
January 1, 1988. Id. PNC also entered into an agreement to acquire Central Bancorpora-
tion, Inc. in 1987. PNC FINANCIAL CORP., supra note 143, at 24. The transaction closed
on February 29, 1988. Id. at 25.
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cent of the document's contents.145 Of the sixty-eight pages, seven-
teen, or twenty-five percent, were devoted to the historical finan-
cial statements.14 Removal of the historical statements would
have significantly trimmed the length, as well as the cost, of the
document.
In contrast, Meridian eliminated the historical earnings and
included only pooled financial statements. 41 Meridian distributed
a substantially thinner annual report. The fifty-four page annual
report contained forty-two pages of financial disclosure.1 48 Not
145. See id. at 25-92.
146. See id.
147. Meridan did not actually use a summary annual report. Instead, the holding
company obtained no-action relief. In a letter dated October 28, 1987, the staff agreed to
permit Meridian to use combined financial statements in the annual report, but imposed
the following conditions:
1. The annual report on Form 10-K which will be filed prior to the distribution
of the annual report to shareholders will include separate historical financial
statements, separate MD & A and separate Guide 3 information for Meridian
and DTC.
2. The annual report to shareholders which will include combined financial state-
ments, MD & A and Guide 3 information will be incorporated by reference in
the Form 10-K.
3. The auditor's report in the annual report to shareholders will contain a middle
paragraph which will describe the combined nature of the basis of presentation.
Prominent disclosure will also be made elsewhere in the annual report indicating
the basis of the presentation and informing shareholders of the existence and
availability of the separate audited historical Meridian and DTC financial state-
ments included in the previously filed Form 10-K. Capsule financial information,
as indicated in your letter, for Meridian and DTC will also be included in the
annual report to shareholders.
4. The 1987 annual report to shareholders will not be circulated prior to
consummation.
5. If the merger is not consummated by March 31, 1988, then the proposed
reporting in the annual report to shareholders would not be appropriate.
Letter from Joseph S. Aleknavage, Assistant Chief Accountant, Division of Corporation
Finance, Securities & Exchange Commission to J. Robert Brown (Oct. 28, 1987). Had no-
action relief not been forthcoming, a summary annual report would have been an appropri-
ate vehicle for achieving the same result.
148. MERIDIAN BANCORP INC., supra note 142, at 12-51. Use of different financial
statements in the Form 10-K and the summary report is not, however, without risk. Al-
though pooled financial statements do not contravene the antifraud provisions, improper
comparisons between pooled and unpooled earnings could. See SEC Policy Statement on
Conflicting Financial Reports and Earnings Computations, Exchange Act Release No.
8,336, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,567, at 83,196 (June
18, 1968)("[I]t is misleading . . . to invite or draw conclusions as to improvement in a
company's operations by comparing pooled figures for a particular year with unpooled
figures for the prior year."). While accounting treatment need not match identically any
divergence that renders the annual report misleading will violate the antifraud provisions.
See Singhvi, supra note 79, at 351 (discussing Commission enforcement actions involving
divergent and misleading accounting treatment in annual reports).
[Vol. 39:39
SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT
only did the omission of historical earnings substantially shorten
the document, but it appears as if the annual report would seem
less formidable to shareholders.
Although the summary annual report offers many benefits, its
use does raise some concerns that merit discussion. First, the staff
position was promulgated in two letters." 9 The position adopted in
these letters could be reversed by either the staff or the Commis-
sion.150 Given the compelling rationale supporting the use of sum-
mary reports, however, the small risk of reversal of the staffs po-
sition should not prevent use of the abbreviated format. Second,
utilization of a summary annual report disrupts the status quo. An
investment of substantial time, energy, thought, and creativity will
be required for the summary annual report to provide an accurate
overview of the company in an understandable fashion. The finan-
cial information normally consigned to the back of the report will
need to be integrated throughout the document. The comfort of
the essentially lock-step disclosure requirements contained in Rule
14a-3(b) will disappear.15
Use of a summary annual report requires one other important
caveat. Issuers must make absolutely certain that the appendix to
their proxy statement contains all of the information required by
Rule 14a-3(b). 152 The concept of a summary annual report is
predicated upon the inclusion of all required information in the
appendix to the proxy statement. With all of the necessary infor-
mation contained in the appendix, companies have fulfilled their
required disclosure obligations, thereby obtaining a free hand in
drafting a summary report.
Issuers should, therefore, hesitate to use the 1987 McKesson
summary report and proxy statement as a model. The McKesson
appendix to the proxy statement inexplicably omitted required in-
formation. The appendix did not include the market price infor-
149. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
151. See supra 128-29 and accompanying text.
152. Rule 14-3(b) requires the annual report to identify the company's executive
officers and directors, indicate their principal occupation or employment, and provide the
name and principal business of any organization employing the officer or director. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(8) (1988). Including such information in the appendix is redundant
because the information is required to appear in the body of the proxy. See Item 7, Regula-
tion 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1988). Nevertheless, with good reason, an issuer in-
tending to treat the appendix as the annual report ought to include all of the information
required by the rule, even if redundant. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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mation required by Rule 14a-3(b)(9), 153 although the information
was in the summary annual report. The appendix also did not un-
dertake to provide a Form 10-K upon request.154 Nor did the doc-
ument contain the information on directors mandated by Rule
14a-3(b)(8). 55
By failing to make these disclosures, McKesson deviated
from the factual representations made in its letter to the Commis-
sion staff. As a result, McKesson arguably lost the right to rely on
the staff letter approving the proposed format. 156 Furthermore,
McKesson, as a technical matter, contravened Rule 14a-3(b).
Shareholders of the company never received a complete annual
report. Nor does it matter that McKesson included the missing
information in the summary annual report. Rule 14b-3(b) un-
equivocally contemplates that the company include all of the in-
formation in the annual report.15 7 Any other interpretation would
enable companies to inundate shareholders with a variety of docu-
ments, each containing a portion of the required disclosure, an un-
tenable result. By failing to conform to Rule 14a-3(b), McKesson
increased the company's exposure under the proxy rules.'5
C. No Annual Report
The most radical option available to issuers involves the com-
plete elimination of a separate annual report. The GM/McKesson
letters essentially took the position that the appendix to the proxy
153. 17 C.F.R. § 14a-3(b)(9) (1988).
154. McKEssoN CORP., PROXY STATEMENT (1987).
155. Id. McKesson represented in the letter that the appendix would contain all of
the information required by Rule 14a-3(b). McKesson Corp., supra note 11. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-3(b)(8) (1988).
156. Materially altering the facts as stated in a letter to the staff may render the
staff opinion invalid. See Beaumont v. American Can Co., 797 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir.
1986)(in seeking guidance from the SEC, a company may lose the protection of a no-action
letter if the transaction is not conducted in the manner represented). See also Lemke,
supra note 14.
157. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-3(b) (1988).
158. While McKesson's omissions seem insignificant, particularly in light of the si-
multaneous distribution of the information in the summary annual report, practical
problems clearly arise. Annual reports to shareholders are integrated into the 1933 Securi-
ties Act and 1934 Exchange Act disclosure requirements. Often the report can be incorpo-
rated by reference into other documents. Failure to completely conform the appendix to the
proxy to the edicts of Rule 14a-3(c) may subsequently prevent incorporation by reference.
As a result of the failure, the appendix arguably ceased to qualify for the exemption from
the proxy rules contained in Rule 14a-3(c). With the exemption unavailable, the document
becomes subject to the antifraud provision in Rule 14a-9, thereby increasing the company's
exposure for any misstatements. See infra notes 163-246 and accompanying text.
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statement fulfilled all of the disclosure requirements of Rule 14a-
3, thereby rendering the annual report superfluous. 159 As a result,
under the reasoning of the letters, a company could eliminate the
document entirely. 160
Nevertheless, some level of caution is required. A decision to
dispense with the annual report requires the balancing of a num-
ber of competing factors. Factors supporting elimination of the
annual report include its cost, its general ineffectiveness, and the
lack of interest often evidenced by shareholders.
On the other hand, the document may enhance shareholder
relations. Annual reports are a vehicle for keeping shareholders
apprised of corporate developments while providing current infor-
mation on the company's performance. This contributes to share-
holder loyalty and satisfaction, which in turn, helps to maintain
stock prices, encourage long-term ownership, and enhance share-
holder loyalty in contests for control.' Moreover, annual reports
have residual value outside of the proxy process. They serve as an
important promotional piece for distribution to investors through-
out the year. Finally, the complaint of ineffectiveness can be over-
come by a creative, well-drafted summary annual report.
A balancing of these competing interests suggests that elimi-
nation of the annual report will usually be disadvantageous, not-
withstanding short-term cost savings. Elimination, however, may
be proper when coupled with an alternative strategy for communi-
159. The Commission staff has previously indicated that a separate annual report
need not be distributed if the proxy statement includes all of the information required by
Rule 14a-3. Frier Industries, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 17, 1975)(LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file)("[T]his Division will not recommend any enforcement action to the
Commission if a separate form of annual report is not furnished to security holders pro-
vided that the proxy statement contains all of the information and undertaking specified in
subparagraphs I through 9 of Rule 14a-3."). Consistent with the letters to GM and Mc-
Kesson, the staff apparently reasoned that insertion of the required information in the
proxy fulfilled the mandates of Rule 14a-3, rendering the glossy annual report superfluous.
160. This statement reflects the views of the authors. See supra note 119. The
NYSE requires the distribution of an annual report to shareholders and further requires
that the report include financial statements. Naw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 203.01 (1983). The rules, therefore, ar-
guably limit the issuer's ability to dispense entirely with financial statements and/or annual
reports. Nevertheless, the authors believe that the information contained in the appendix to
the proxy statement should fulfill the NYSE annual report requirement.
161. See Sandier, Heads of Some Big Companies Make Effort to Show Sharehold-
ers They Really Do Care, Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1987, at 55, col. 2 (noting that corporate
efforts to improve shareholder relations are on the rise, in part because management
"wants sympathetic holders in case it wants to make or resist an acquisition or raise
capital").
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cating with shareholders. For example, a company might complete
a detailed and colorful report but decide against indiscriminate
distribution.0 2 Under such a scheme, the annual report would be
provided to shareholders upon request (perhaps through a postage
paid card included in the proxy materials), replacing indiscrimi-
nate and ineffective distribution with a more focused mailing.
Alternatively, funds saved from the mailing of a standard an-
nual report could be used to send communications to shareholders
on a more frequent basis. In place of an annual, unread report,
shareholders might receive instead frequent communications up-
dating the company's performance. Whether such a strategy
would be effective depends upon the particular company involved
and the nature of its shareholders. Institutional investors that read
and rely upon the Form 10-K might prefer continual updates in
place of a once-a-year conventional annual report.
IV. ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
A. Background
As a result of the GM/McKesson letters, management now
has an enhanced flexibility to communicate with shareholders
through an annual report free of the formal strictures of the proxy
rules. The newly-endorsed summary report is essentially an unreg-
ulated document. An issuer need not use one, and the style and
content are left entirely to the discretion of management. Man-
agement can gauge the message it seeks to send to shareholders
and then draft a direct, readable document suited to that purpose.
Of course, flexibility comes at a price. That price comes in
the form of latent uncertainty over whether the summary annual
report will implicate concerns under various provisions of the se-
curities laws. The absence of form and content regulation makes
162. This approach would effectively recognize that not everyone has the same abil-
ity or inclination to digest information about the company. Rather than waste corporate
assets through an indiscriminate mailing, the practice of including a return card would
ensure that only those interested would receive the report. Notwithstanding the more lim-
ited distribution, the information in the report would still be in the public domain and
reflected in stock prices. See Demmler, Private Suits Based on Violation of the Proxy
Rules, 20 U. PrrT. L. REV. 587, 598 (1959)(This article, written by a former chairman of
the SEC, notes that most shareholders do not read proxy solicitation materials but that
"analysts, investment advisors, conscientious brokers and dealers, institutional investors and
intelligent individual investors do read proxy soliciting material concerning important
transactions, and the composite opinion of those sophisticated people spreads, as gossip,
through the 'Street' and influences other stockholders.").
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the summary annual report analogous to a letter to shareholders,
and like other such documents, subject to the proscriptions of the
general antifraud provisions and perhaps even to the proxy rules.
B. The Proxy Rules
Conventional annual reports have always received special
treatment under the proxy rules. Annual reports can clearly influ-
ence the proxy process,163 and, to that extent, they come within
the scope of the Commission's regulatory authority.16 4 The proxy
rules, however, exempted annual reports from some of the regula-
tory hazards that applied to other writings sent to shareholders. 65
Rule 14a-3(c) deemed an annual report not to be "filed" with the
Commission,16 6 rendering the express remedy in Section 18 of the
Exchange Act 67 inapplicable. 68  Under Section 18, buyers and
sellers who detrimentally relied on false or misleading statements
in documents filed with the Commission could recover damages
unless the filing person demonstrated good faith and a lack of
knowledge that the statement was false or misleading. 6
More significantly, the proxy rules eliminated the annual re-
port from the definition of "soliciting material.' 170 In so doing, the
163. See generally Sommer, The Annual Report: A Prime Disclosure Document,
1972 DUKE L.J. 1093, 1101-02 (as long ago as 1942, the SEC sought to include the annual
report within the definition of "proxy soliciting material").
164. SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943) (Congressional regulation ap-
plies not only to a "proxy, power of attorney, consent or authorization" but also to other
writings that are a part of a plan which ends in solicitation).
165. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1974).
166. Rule 14a-3(c) provides that the "report is not deemed to be. .. 'filed' with the
Commission ...." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1988).
167. See supra note 46.
168. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1988) ("The report is not . . . subject to . . .the
liabilities of section 18 of the Act ...."). Issuers can, however, voluntarily make Section
18 applicable either by specifically requesting that the report be considered part of the
proxy soliciting materials-or by incorporating the annual report by reference into the proxy
statement.
169. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1986))(no liability if "the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no
knowledge"). This exemption, however, is less significant in light of the expanded role that
Rule lOb-5 plays in private civil actions. A private remedy exists under Rule lOb-5 for
false or misleading statements in an annual report. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909,
913-14 (2d Cir. 1968) (applying Rule 10b-5, court concluded that the plaintiffs satisfied
the "in connection" requirement thus stating a valid cause of action), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 903 (1969).
170. Rule 14a-3(c) provides that the "report is not deemed to be 'soliciting material'
." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1988).
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rules effectively exempted the annual report - even one that oth-
erwise would have fallen within the definition of "solicitation" in
Rule 14a-1 l' x - from the strictures of the proxy rules, including
the pre-filing requirements of Rule 14a-6, a11 the timing provisions
of Rule 14a-3(a),' 7' and possibly the antifraud provisions of Rule
14a-9.17 4 The rules drew the report into the full proxy process only
if it "comment[ed] on or refer[red] to any solicitation."' 7 5 The
171. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (1988).
172. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1988).
173. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (1988).
174. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1988); See Malhas v. Shinn, 597 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.
1979)("ICC's annual report was not proxy material the contents of which violated Rule
14a-9-4(a)."); Leist v. American Bakeries Co., No. 80-1-2088 (N.D. 11. Apr. 22,
1981)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file)("The Court concludes that the Company's 1980
Annual Report is not soliciting material and is exempt from the provisions of Regulation
14A, including Rule 14a-9(a)."); Markewich v. Adikes, 422 F. Supp. 1144, 1146-47
(E.D.N.Y. 1976)(noting that the failure to correct an annual report does not violate Sec-
tion 14(a)); Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214, 1230 (D. Del.) (the annual report is ex-
empted from liability under all of section 14's rules except rule 14a-3), affd, 453 F.2d 876
(3d Cir. 1971). These cases do not consider whether an annual report comes within the
antifraud provisions when it contains a direct comment on a proxy solicitation. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(f) (1988). Since the exemption from the antifraud provisions recog-
nized by these cases is based on the exemption in Rule 14a-3(c), the authors believe that
an annual report that loses that exemption under 14a-1 1(f) would come within the an-
tifraud provisions.
One court appears to have based liability under Rule 14a-9 on misstatements in the
14a-3 annual report. In Gladwin v. Medfield Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) V 95,013, at 97,536 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 1975), aff'd, 540 F.2d 1266 (5th
Cir. 1976), the court concluded that Medfield had violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9
by failing adequately to disclose that it had incurred liability for refunds in connection with
its participation in the Medicare program. The liability was sufficiently substantial to influ-
ence both past and present earnings. Yet the proxy statement referred to the liability only
in a note to the consolidated financial statement in the annual report. The court, and the
subsequent affirming court of appeals did not discuss the Rule 14a-3(c) exemption or the
Dillon line of cases. See also 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION (2d ed. 1961).
Occasionally, however, the report to stockholders is so phrased that it is in fact
supplementary proxy literature. In other words, although the report is not per se
'soliciting material,' the inclusion of material of that character in the report does
not necessarily insulate it from the operation of the proxy rules.
Id. at 887-88.
175. Rule 14a-l1(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(f) (1988). Read together, Rules 14a-
3(c) and 14a-1 1(f) treat annual reports as exceptions to the otherwise expansive definition
of "solicitation" under Rule 14a-1. Annual reports may, however, forfeit their safe harbor
from the proxy rules. To the extent that an annual report touches on topics germane to the
issue in a proxy statement, it may comprise "part of a continuous plan ending in [a] solici-
tation and which prepare[s] the way for its success." SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d
Cir. 1943)(holding a shareholder's letter to other shareholders in anticipation of a proxy
solicitation to be subject to the proxy rules). See generally Long Island Lighting Co. v.
Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1985)(indirect communications placed in publica-
tions of general circulation may be subject to proxy rules if, in a chain of communications,
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rules essentially treated the report as a purveyor of background
information, and, although the rules regulated the timing of the
report's distribution, the courts generally have imposed no duty to
correct or clarify the contents of the document.7 6
The exemption from the proxy rules for the conventional an-
nual report is not an academic matter. Under Rule 14a-1, the
term "solicitation" includes any "communication to security hold-
ers under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the pro-
curement, withholding or revocation of a proxy. 1 7 A traditional
annual report could amount to a communication reasonably - if
not actually - calculated to result in procuring a proxy. The re-
port may not mention the meeting or ask for a proxy, yet by
touching on the matters germane to the meeting, may literally be
part of a solicitation. Indeed, the Commission has acknowledged
that annual reports may technically be part of a solicitation under
the rules, but as a matter of policy, has treated them as having no
direct connection with the proxy solicitation process. 7
they constitute a step designed ultimately to solicit proxies); Brown v. Chicago, Rock Is-
land & Pac. R.R., 328 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1964)(public advertisement held not to be
subject to the proxy rules where it was intended to inform the public rather than calculated
to procure proxies). The Commission, however, opted for only a limited application of the
rules to those annual reports which influenced the proxy process. As the issuing release for
the first version of Rule 14a-1 1(f) explained:
For many years, the proxy rules have provided that the annual report, a copy of
which must be furnished to security holders, is not deemed to be proxy material.
As a result of the Commission's experience in a number of cases, the rules have
been amended to provide that if any portion of the report is devoted to an attack
or comment upon an opposition solicitation or opposition group, that portion of
the report must be filed as proxy material in advance of publication.
Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 5,276, [1956 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,380, at 79,534-36 (Jan. 17, 1956).
176. See Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214, 1229-31 (D. Del.), affid, 453 F.2d 876
(3d Cir. 1971).
177. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(K)(l)(iii) (1988).
178. The adopting release for the 1956 revision of the-rules stated:
There was some concern expressed . . .that all semi-annual and quarterly re-
ports and other communications containing information and comment concern-
ing the business of the character normally sent to security holders by corporate
management during the course of a fiscal year might be deemed to involve a
solicitation and to be proxy material under the revised definition [of a solicita-
tion]. This problem is not a new one and has previously existed under the rules.
It is not the intention of the Commission and it is not the purpose of the amend-
ments to subject such communications to the proxy rules . . . . In the ordinary
case, it is not believed that this matter presents any real problem and the Com-
mission has no desire to require the filing of the types of communications nor-
mally sent to security holders during the year.
Exchange Act Release No. 5,276, supra note 175, at 79,534.
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An issuer, however, cannot lightly assume that the courts or
the Commission will apply the exemption to summary annual re-
ports.179 The exemption from the proxy rules in Rule 14a-3(c) ap-
plies only to the full annual report required by Rule 14a-3(b);
nothing in the rule or in the GM/McKesson letters implies that
the summary annual report should enjoy similar protection. With-
out the comfort of the exemption provided by the rule, an issuer
contemplating the summary annual report format must consider
carefully whether the report will constitute the "solicitation" of a
proxy.
In resolving the issue, the timing of the report may become
crucial. The courts are understandably reluctant to deter "expedi-
tious reporting of significant developments that may affect the
price of a corporation's stock." 80 This policy is counterbalanced,
however, by the legitimate desire to restrict management's use of
communications with shareholders to influence the proxy pro-
cess. 18' In balancing these competing interests, courts are less
likely to draw the communication into the proxy regulation
scheme, the longer the period of time between dissemination of
the communication and the shareholder meeting.'82
179. As a voluntary communication subject to no formal restrictions, the summary
annual report should receive treatment comparable to that accorded general communica-
tions such as shareholder letters. This will not, however, immunize the summary annual
report from application of the proxy rules. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 767-68
(5th Cir. 1974)(shareholder letter concerning refinancing plan held part of a solicitation
thus triggering a cause of action under the proxy rules); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
489 F.2d 579, 600-01 (5th Cir.) (shareholder letter not part of solicitation), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974). The principal factor that distinguished Smallwood was that the let-
ter was issued soon enough after the agreement and long enough before the shareholder
meeting for the court to conclude that the company had intended only to inform sharehold-
ers, not to influence their vote on the merger. Since distribution of a summary annual
report would occur annually, rather than upon a significant corporate event, it is difficult to
predict how a court might treat a report containing similar information. At least one case
has held that an annual report not conforming with the requirements of Rule 14a-3(b) lost
its immunity from the proxy rules. Lynch v. Fulks, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 97,831, at 90,135 (D. Kan. Dec. 12, 1980). In Lynch, the defendant sent a
letter to shareholders enclosing a proxy. He argued that the letter did not constitute a
solicitation, because it was really an annual report and therefore exempt from the require-
ments of the proxy rules. In dispatching this argument, the court noted that "[u]nder Rule
14a-3(b) an exempt annual report must meet elaborate specifications that consume over
two pages in the Code of Federal Regulations." Id. Because the letter failed the require-
ments of Rule 14a-3(b), the exemption granted annual reports was held unavailable.
180. Smallwood, 489 F.2d at 601.
181. See infra text at note 185.
182. See Sargent, 492 F.2d at 767 (letter sent at time of usual proxy solicitation
period may be regulated by proxy rules); Smallwood, 489 F.2d at 601 (letter sent immedi-
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Whether a summary annual report distributed before a proxy
statement constitutes soliciting material will likely turn upon the
issuer's purpose in sending the document.18 3 To the extent that the
document merely presents a condensed version of the financial and
business matters contained in the Form 10-K or the Rule 14a-3(b)
appendix to the proxy, the summary annual report is less likely to
be treated by the courts as part of a "solicitation." '184 Where, on
the other hand, a summary annual report comments directly or
indirectly on significant issues at stake in the annual meeting -
such as mergers, rights, plans, shareholder factions - the sum-
mary report may constitute a "solicitation." As one court noted in
the context of a shareholder letter:
There are sound reasons for limiting the ability of interested
parties to color the issues prior to the disclosure of complete in-
formation as required in a proxy statement. Without some re-
strictions, seeds of argument could be planted so deeply and se-
curely prior to the time of formal proxy solicitation as to resist
effectively later uprooting.185
Courts, as well as the Commission, might regard an attempt to
ately after event occured and well before stockholder meeting not regulated by proxy
rules); Brown v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 328 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1964)(ad-
vertisement published prior to the time any stockholder meeting was called or proxies solic-
ited held not regulated by proxy rules).
183. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1985); Stude-
baker v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1966); Brown, 328 F.2d at 125; Data Probe
Acquisition Corp. v. Datalab, Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
T 99,451, at 96,577-78 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1983); Canadian Javelin Ltd. v. Brooks, 462 F.
Supp. 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kass v. Arden, Mayfair, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1037, 1046
(C.D. Cal. 1977); Chris-Craft Indus. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp.
895, 906 (D. Del. 1973).
184. Even a report that merely summarizes information otherwise available in the
Form 10-K is not necessarily safe from scrutiny under the proxy rules. The Commission
regulated the contents of the annual report precisely because it deemed the information
important to shareholders in exercising their corporate franchise in an informed manner.
See supra notes 20-75 and accompanying text. So, for example, if a report unfairly sum-
marizes matters relevant to shareholder evaluation of management's performance, the au-
thors doubt that the issuer could avoid application of the proxy rules' antifraud provisions.
185. Smallwood, 489 F.2d at 600. In Smallwood, the court ultimately concluded
that the shareholder letter at issue there did not amount to a solicitation. The court con-
cluded that the letter, which concerned a proposed merger, was disseminated so soon after
the agreement and so long before the proxy solicitation process began that the letter was
not "calculated to result in the procurement ... of a proxy." Id. at 601. When compared
with cases such as Sargent, 492 F.2d at 767-68, which concluded that a similar letter was a
solicitation, Smallwood underscores the criticality assumed by timing issues when a sum-
mary annual report addresses topics that are later voted upon in a subsequent shareholders
meeting.
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communicate on such issues as merely an early step by manage-
ment in a chain of communications culminating in the solicitation
of a proxy.""
The likelihood that the document falls within the definition of
soliciting material is much stronger for a summary annual report
distributed after the proxy statement but before the shareholder
meeting. This period is the most sensitive; the time when the vot-
ing decision of shareholders can be readily influenced. Under such
circumstances, even general comments about an issuer's financial
condition may influence shareholders executing their proxy
cards.18 7
If a summary annual report does constitute solicitation mate-
rial, it becomes subject to the same timing and filing requirements
as shareholder letters and other supplemental communications.
Unlike the annual report contemplated by Rule 14a-3(b), solicit-
ing materials must be filed with the Commission at least two days
before distribution.'"8 That filing can form the basis for liability
under Section 18 of the Exchange Act. 89 Unlike the annual re-
186. Long Island Lighting Co., 779 F.2d at 796. Press releases and shareholder let-
ters touching on proxy-related subjects have been successfully challenged under the proxy
antifraud rules. Sargent, 492 F.2d at 767-68; Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp.,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,765 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 1986);
Transworld Corp. v. Odyssey Partners, 561 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See
generally Studebaker Corp., 360 F.2d at 692; SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.
1943)("[H]is statement, if the facts were as alleged, was none the less untrue, and should
not have been made.").
187. To be sure, Section 14 was not intended to subject every management commu-
nication with shareholders to intense scrutiny. Issen v. GSC Indus., 508 F. Supp. 1278,
1294 (N.D. Ill. 1981)("[S]ection 14 was not intended by Congress to subject every infor-
mational communication by management to shareholders to stringent scrutiny."). Never-
theless, a communication discussing topics that bear on the subject of the meeting risks the
court's searching examination. See SEC v. McQuistion, 5 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 332, 333-34
(S.D.N.Y. 1947)(management letter that informed shareholders of a delay in mailing of
the proxy statement became part of the solicitation because it contained a characterization
of the position held by the opposing faction in the proxy contest). Nor will the fact that the
communication is styled as an annual report, whose contents are tailored to include only
the required items of Rule 14a-3(b), conclusively set it outside the proxy rules. At least one
court has found a management communication to constitute part of a solicitation even
though the information contained therein was compulsory. See Dataprobe Acquisition
Corp. v. Datalab, Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 99,451, at
96,577-78 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1983)(management's comments concerning a tender offer,
required by Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1988), held part of the solicitation of
proxies).
188. The filing provisions of Rule 14a-6 require that soliciting material be filed with
the Commission two days before being sent to shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(b)
(1988).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 166-69.
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port contemplated by Rule 14a-3(b),190 which must reach share-
holders prior to or contemporaneously with the proxy statement,
Rule 14a-6 191 requires that a solicitation must reach shareholders
after they receive the proxy statement. Thus, to the extent that
the content of the summary annual report can be construed as a
"solicitation," an issuer risks application of the full panoply of
regulatory requirements contained in the proxy rules. 92
C. Antifraud Concerns
The applicability of the timing and pre-filing provisions, even
the status of the document as "filed" for purposes of Section 18,
present cumbersome but not insurmountable problems. Of greater
concern, however, is the applicability of the antifraud provisions to
the summary annual report. The GM/McKesson letters 93 them-
selves indicate that the summary annual report remains subject to
the antifraud provisions. The letters, however, do not specify all of
the provisions which might apply. The status of the summary an-
nual report under particular antifraud provisions therefore re-
mains unclear.
1. Rule 14a-9
Perhaps the most critical issue concerns the applicability of
Rule 14a-9.194 In the GM/McKesson letters, the staff implied
that the annexing of the financial information required by Rule
14a-3(b) substantially satisfied the regulatory concerns that
prompted the regulation of the contents of the report in the proxy
rules.195 Moreover, the GM letter states only that the antifraud
provisions would apply to the summary report because such re-
ports "can reasonably be expected to affect the market for the
corporation's securities."1 96 With no mention of untoward impact
on voting rights, this statement implies that the staff views the
190. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1988).
191. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(b) (1988).
192. Moreover, courts have held that a private right of action exists for violation of
the timing and pre-filing provisions contained in the proxy rules. See supra note 169.
193. See supra note 11.
194. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1988). A separate antifraud provision, Rule 14c-6, gov-
erns information statements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-6 (1988). Discussions of the proxy an-
tifraud provisions in this article, however, will focus exclusively on Rule 14a-9.
195. See text at supra notes 99-109.
196. General Motors Corp., supra note 11, at 77,311. See also supra text accompa-
nying note 106.
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principal antifraud concerns as arising not under the proxy rules
but rather under the general antifraud provisions of Rule 1Ob-5.
Once again, however, this analysis depends in part on the
contents and characterization of the summary report. Just as a
summary report that falls within the definition of solicitation will
trigger the timing and filing requirements of Rule 14a-6,1 97 it will
also trigger the antifraud provisions of Rule 14a-9. 198 The applica-
bility of this rule raises important concerns. As with other an-
tifraud provisions, Rule 14a-9 prohibits false or misleading dis-
closure.199 Unlike the ubiquitous Rule lOb-5,200 however, the
proxy antifraud provision does not require proof of scienter; sim-
ple negligence will suffice.20 1 Moreover, while other antifraud pro-
visions - particularly Section 17 of the Securities Act 02 - pre-
serve a negligence standard for recovery,203 doubts exist about a
private right of action under those provisions.20 4 Rule 14a-9 poses
197. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974). In Sargent,
the letter to shareholders that was held to have violated Rule 14a-9 inaccurately described
a refinancing plan on which shareholders were not even being asked to vote. Id. at 766-68.
See also Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 92,765, at 93,748-49 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 1986)(holding that a misleading
press release violated Rule 14a-9).
199. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-9(a) (1988).
200. 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1988).
201. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship, 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir.
1976)(negligence is the appropriate standard under § 14(a)); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973) (In Rule 14a-9 action plaintiffs "are not
required to establish any evil motive or even reckless disregard of the facts); Fradkin v.
Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829, 843 (N.D. Ohio 1983) ("negligence standard should apply to the
corporation issuing the proxy statement"). The Sixth Circuit has required scienter in a
14a-9 action, but only in connection with the liability of corporate outsiders. Adams v.
Standard Knitting Mills, 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
202. Securities Act of 1933, Section 17 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1986)).
203. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980)(scienter not required for subsections (a)(2)
and (a)(3) of Section 17); Design Time, Inc. v. Synthetic Diamond Technology, [1987-
1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,634 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 13, 1987).
204. Some circuits have concluded that no private right of action exists under the
section. Currie v. Cayman Resources, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 93,591 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 1988); Landay v. All American Assurance Co., 688
F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1982); Shull v. Dain Kalman & Quail Inc., 561 F.2d 152 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). Other circuits disagree and have found an im-
plied right. Schimmel v. Strategic Oil Leasing Partners, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,560 (D. Ore. May 28, 1987); Richey v. Westinghouse Credit,
[1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 93,586 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 29,
1986); Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
909 (1979); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court has
expressly declined to decide the question on at least two occasions. See Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.2 (1983)("We have previously reserved deci-
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no similar uncertainty.205
The specter of Rule 14a-9 liability constitutes an important
consideration when deciding whether to issue a summary annual
report. This is especially true in the context of a proxy contest or
an annual meeting that will raise a significant corporate event
such as a merger or rights plan. While doubt may exist as to the
applicability of Rule 14a-9 to a traditional Rule 14a-3(b) annual
report,20 6 no such doubt would arise for summary annual reports
falling within the definition of soliciting material. Unlike the
traditional Rule 14a-3(b) annual report, the summary annual re-
port would probably receive the treatment under the rules ac-
corded to press releases, shareholder letters and other communica-
tions issued during the course of a proxy solicitation. 07
2. General Antifraud Provisions of Rule 1Ob-5
Rule 14a-9 does not represent the only hurdle issuers of a
summary annual report must confront. An issuer must also con-
sider whether a summary annual report will be compatible with
the general antifraud provisions. The GM/McKesson letters ex-
pressly refer to the possibility of liability under Section 17 of the
1933 Act208 and Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act.209
At first blush, the need to reference the antifraud provisions
sion on whether § 17(a) affords a private remedy . . .and we do so again."); Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689 (1980)("this Court. . .has not had occasion to address the ques-
tion whether a private cause of action exists under § 17(a)."). The weight of authority is
clearly against a private right of action. Indeed, in 1987, the Ninth Circuit overruled two
prior panel opinions that had found a private right of action. See In re Washington Pub.
Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987)(en banc)(Judge (now Su-
preme Court Justice) Kennedy participated in the case and supported the majority opin-
ion). See also Newcome v. Esrey, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 94,106 (4th Cir.
Dec. 16, 1988)(en banc)(no private right of action under Section 17(a)).
205. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964)(finding a private right of
action under Rule 14a-9). Similar results obtain regarding the existence of private rights of
action under the other various SEC rules adopted pursuant to Section 14 of the Securities
Act. See Rauchman v. Mobil Corp., 739 F.2d 205, 208 (6th Cir. 1984)(private right of
action under Rule 14a-8); Haas v. Wieboldt Stores, 725 F.2d 71, 73 (7th Cir. 1984)(pri-
vate right of action under Rule 14a-7); Ash v. GAF, 723 F.2d 1090, 1092 (3rd Cir.
1983)(private right of action under Rule 14a-3). The issue is so settled that one court
characterized the argument that a private right of action did not exist under Rule 14a-6 as
"unbelievably specious." Lynch v. Fulks, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 97,831 (D. Kan. Dec. 12, 1980).
206. See supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 203.
209. See supra note 47.
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may appear puzzling. Annual reports can certainly give rise to lia-
bility under either the Rule 14a-9210 or Rule lOb-5.2 11 A Rule
14a-3 annual report, however, has substantial overlap with the
Form 10-K.212 The conventional annual report, therefore, does not
generally present antifraud issues distinct from the report filed on
Form 10-K. Moreover, at least one court has opined that only the
Form 10-K filing actually triggers the application of Rule 1Ob-
5.213
The new summary report, however, will presumably not have
as substantial an overlap with the contents of the Form 10-K. By
design, a summary annual report conveys a simpler, more direct
message than the material presented in the Form 10-K. The sum-
mary annual report will condense or omit completely the more de-
tailed information typically included in the Form 10-K and the
proxy statement. This condensation and simplification of disclos-
ure will inevitably raise concerns of completeness and accuracy.
These concerns will be particularly acute when the summary an-
nual report is distributed prior to the proxy statement and Form
10-K.
An issuer can reduce the risk of liability by disseminating the
Form 10-K prior to the mailing of the summary annual report.
Nevertheless, an accurate Form 10-K will not obviate liability for
a false summary report. A report that is patently false will gener-
ate liability even if the issuer makes accurate disclosure through
other means. The more complete disclosure available to the mar-
ket in the full report will likely raise an insurmountable obstacle
to allegations of materially incomplete summary reports, particu-
larly to fraud allegations based upon a "fraud on the market" the-
ory.214 So long as full and accurate disclosure is available to secur-
210. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
211. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968) (annual report may give rise to
Rule 10b-5 liability), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969). See also In re Apple Computer
Sec. Litig., 672 F. Supp. 1552, 1564-65 (N.D. Cal. 1987)(statement taken from an annual
report found not misleading and thus not violative of general antifraud provisions).
212. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
213. SEC v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Regarding proxy
materials, the Benson court suggested that they might fail the "in connection with" re-
quirement imposed under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id.
214. The "fraud on the market" or "integrity of the market" theory posits that mar-
ket participants need not demonstrate their reliance on fraudulent statements in publicly
filed documents such as registration statements and annual reports to state a cause of ac-
tion under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The theory rests on the
notion that the market has relied on the false information in setting the price for the secur-
ities. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981)(en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
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ities analysts and market participants, plaintiffs may have
considerable difficulty demonstrating that the summary annual re-
port adversely affected the price of the security.
If the summary annual report reaches the market before the
fuller disclosure of the Form 10-K report and proxy statement, the
completeness and accuracy of the summary report is likely to be
examined with more exacting scrutiny. Without full and accurate
disclosure in the securities market, an issuer runs the risk of af-
fecting the market in its securities on the basis of an informal and
summary document. Prudence dictates that the more risk-prone
summary document should be distributed only after circulation of
the less readable, highly regulated, defensively drafted Form 10-K
and proxy statement.1 5
Incomplete or inaccurate statements in a summary annual re-
port - for the purposes of both Rule 14a-9 and Rule 1Ob-5 liabil-
1102 (1983); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Note, The
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1143 (1982) (the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance should be applied only in developed markets, where the efficient
market hypothesis will most likely hold true). The Supreme Court explained the rationale
for the theory:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and
developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the
available material information regarding the company and its business, mislead-
ing statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers
do not directly rely on the misstatements . . ..
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 988-89 (1988)(quoting Peil v. Spreiser, 806 F.2d
1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
215. Of course, the degree to which the antifraud provisions ensure adequate disclos-
ure is unclear. Municipal bonds are exempt from registration under the Securities Act of
1933. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(2)(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(2) (1986)). As
such, the content of a bond circular is not governed by the affirmative line item disclosure
requirements in Regulation S-K, but is subject to the requirements of the antifraud provi-
sions. See Brown, Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 741 (1985)(discussing affirmative disclosure obligations imposed by the an-
tifraud provisions). Recent lawsuits and investigations suggest that the disclosure in bond
circulars has often been inadequate. See Wells, Tiny Matthews & Wright is Center of Big
Litigation, Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1987, at 6, col. 1; see also Forbes & McGrath, Disclosure
Practices in Tax-Exempt General Obligation Bonds: An Update, 7 MUN. FIN. J. 207, 208
(1986) (Authors conducted a survey of disclosure in official statements of tax-exempt gen-
eral obligation bonds. The results indicated disclosure to investors has increased. In the
context of the summary annual report, however, the antifraud provisions may provide
greater assurance of adequate disclosure. The offering circular for bonds may contain the
only public information about the bonds and the use of the bond proceeds. A summary
annual report, however, will only be one of many disclosure documents issued by a publicly
traded company. These other documents - particularly periodic reports, proxy statements
and registration statements - are subject to affirmative disclosure requirements and pre-
sumably will ensure that the public has adequate information about an issuer.
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ity - are analyzed according to their effect on the "total mix" of
information available to shareholders.216 The greater the variety
and depth of information available on the subject, the more per-
suasively management can argue that any statements in a sum-
mary annual report were not materially false or misleading.
3. Projections
One area of obvious risk concerns the use of projections and
other forward looking statements in summary annual reports. As
any issuer knows, projections can provide prospective investors
with valuable information and assist market professionals in their
analysis of a company's prospects. At the same time, disclosure of
projections is fraught with risk. Attempts to forecast the future
often prove incorrect. Disgruntled shareholders often attempt to
use incorrect projections to obtain damages under the antifraud
217 fprovisions. While often unsuccessful, such suits have a habit of
surviving motions to dismiss and other attempts at early stages to
arrest their progress.
Aware of the value of forward looking information, the Com-
mission has adopted a safe harbor rule designed to reduce man-
agement's exposure to liability for projections that ultimately
prove incorrect. Any projection meeting the requirements of Rule
175218 will not be deemed fraudulent unless made in bad faith or
without a reasonable basis. 219 The rule also shifts to plaintiffs the
burden of establishing bad faith or unreasonable basis.220
The safe harbor rule applies only to projections appearing in
216. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988); see also TSC Industries v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)(An omitted fact will be considered material
under Rule 14a-9 if there is "a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total
mix' of information made available.").
217. See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 775 (3d Cir.) ("There is considerable
authority that projections, forecasts and opinions are actionable as misleading in a variety
of circumstances."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059,
1069 (2d Cir. 1985)("Given defendants' positive predictions and the allegations of knowl-
edge of the undisclosed negative factors . . . we conclude that the Complaint adequately
stated a claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-.").
218. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1988). The value of Rule 175 as a safe harbor has been
questioned. Brown, supra note 215, at 796; see also Jackson v. Daniels [1984-1985 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,045 (D.N.M. Apr. 12, 1985)(bank holding
company could not rely on Rule 175 for alleged misrepresentations and omissions about
projected loan loss reserves).
219. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (1988).
220. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(b)(1) (1988).
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certain Commission filings, including annual reports meeting the
requirements of Rule 14a-3. 221 Since a summary report does not
meet the requirements of the Rule, projections inserted only in the
abbreviated report will not receive the protections of the safe har-
bor. A simple way to gain the Rule's protection would be to in-
clude the projection in the appendix to the proxy statement and
repeat it in the summary report. Under Rule 175, a projection in
the summary annual report will fall within the safe harbor if re-
peated in a quarterly report, annual report to shareholders, or any
other document "filed" with the Commission.22
4. Section 12 of the 1933 Act
As the previous discussion indicates, the summary annual re-
port raises concerns under the antifraud provisions typically not
present with more conventional, glossy annual reports. Yet in at
least one instance, use of the abbreviated report will materially
reduce the prospect of liability under the securities laws. Issuers
meeting certain eligibility requirements may register securities on
Form S-2.223 Reflecting acceptance of the efficient market the-
ory,224 the form permits issuers to incorporate into the registration
statement extensive information from previously filed docu-
ments.2 25 With respect to information contained in the annual re-
port to shareholders, however, issuers using Form S-2 must either
repeat the information in the registration statement or distribute
the most recent annual report along with it.228
221. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(b) (1988). See also Safe Harbor Rule for Projections,
Securities Act Release No. 6,084, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %
82,117 (June 25, 1979) ("Statements made outside of these documents will be covered by
the rule only if they are included in documents filed with the Commission or. . . in annual
reports to shareholders meeting the requirements" of Rules 14a-3 or 14c-3.).
222. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(b)(1) (1988).
223. The general instructions for the form limit its potential users to those issuers
who have been subject to the periodic reporting requirements for at least three years, filed
all required reports for the prior twelve months in a timely fashion and did not, within the
past year, fail to pay a dividend on preferred stock or default on certain payments. 17
C.F.R. § 239.12 (1988).
224. See Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Secur-
ities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6,331 (Aug. 6, 1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 41,904
[hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 6,331](Form S-3 "is predicated on the Commis-
sion's belief that the market operates efficiently for these companies, i.e., that the disclos-
ure in Exchange Act reports and other communications by the registrant, such as press
releases, has already been disseminated and accounted for by the marketplace.").
225. 17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (1988).
226. Id. The Commission apparently permitted distribution of the annual report with
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Although convenient, distribution of annual reports with the
registration statement on Form S-2 raises the specter of liability
under the 1933 Act. Section 11 of the Act227 permits actions for
rescission or damages for misstatements contained in an effective
registration statement. Apparently in an effort to minimize the ap-
plicability of Section 11 liability to annual reports, the instruc-
tions to Form S-2 allow issuers to designate the portions of the
report that will not become "part of" the registration state-
ment.228 Outside the registration statement, the designated provi-
sions of the annual report are presumably not subject to Section
11.229
The practical effect of the instructions to Form S-2 is to per-
mit issuers to keep out of the registration statement the narrative
portion of the annual report (i.e., the part of the annual report
most likely to contain hyperbole and other statements that might
be the basis for a suit under Section 11).230 Whatever insulation
from liability under Section 11 is provided by the instructions,
Section 12(2) remains an unaddressed concern. 231 A misleading
statement in the portion of the report not incorporated by refer-
ence into the registration statement may be actionable under Sec-
tion 12(2).232
Section 12(2) imposes liability not only for misleading state-
ments in a registration statement, but also for any misleading
statements or omissions made in connection with the offer or sale
of securities. Section 12, therefore, would impose liability for any
the prospectus as a cost reduction measure. See Securities Act Release No. 6,331, supra
note 224, at 41,916 ("The Commission believes, however, that the option of annual report
delivery provides registrants the opportunity to take advantage of an existing document to
effect registration cost savings where appropriate, particularly since, as the form indicates,
a legible facsimile of the annual report may be used.").
227. Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1986)).
228. Item 12(b), Form S-2, 17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (1988)("[T]he registrant may also
state, if it so chooses, that specifically described portions of its annual or quarterly report to
security holders, other than those portions required to be incorporated by reference pursu-
ant to paragraphs (a), (3) and (4) above, are not part of the registration statement.").
229. While that seems to be the clear import of the Form, whether a court would
necessarily agree is another question.
230. See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 672 F. Supp. 1552, 1562-63 (N.D. Cal.
1987)(allegations that letter to shareholders in annual report was misleading under Rule
lOb-5).
231. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2)(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1986)).
Some have expressed concern over the specter of liability under Section 12(2) for those
portions of the annual report not incorporated into the registration statement. See Matrix
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (June 30, 1983)(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
232. This statement reflects the views of the authors. See supra note 119.
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misleading statement in an annual report distributed with the re-
gistration on Forms S-2, including the narrative and other por-
tions specifically excluded from the registration statement. Section
12(2) has a broad reach with coverage extending not only to di-
rect sellers, but also to those participating in the sale.13 3 Section
12(2) provides a single defense: that in the exercise of reasonable
care, the seller "could not have known" about the misstatement.3 4
Liability under Section 12(2) could be minimized by using a
summary annual report. The required disclosure would be in-
cluded in the appendix to the proxy statement, 35 with the narra-
tive discussion and other hyperbole moved to the summary annual
report. A registrant using Form S-2 could circulate the appendix
to the proxy with the Form S-2 registration statement, thereby
disassociating the narrative from the offering process. 2 36
D. Registration Concerns
Gun jumping is another possible concern with the use of sum-
233. Courts have generally held lawyers and banks liable as sellers only where they
were "substantial participants" in the illegal sales. To be a "substantial participant" re-
quired something more than routine involvement. Ordinary activities such as preparing
documents or lending money were not enough. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Proud Excelsior Ltd.,
[1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,754 (D. Utah Apr. 24,
1987)(bank acting as trustee for bonds that provided routine services not liable under Sec-
tion 12(2) as seller). Instead, courts looked for additional factors such as direct participa-
tion in the sales effort or supervising the scheme. The Supreme Court, however, recently
adopted a somewhat different test. See Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988)(although
interpreting Section 12(1), the court's analysis bearing on the issue discussed herein would
apply as well to Section 12(2)). The Court in Dahl rejected the contention that the term
"seller" extended no farther than the person who actually transferred title. Instead, the
Court held that the term extended to anyone "who solicit[s] securities purchases." Id. at
2078. Recognizing the breadth of the test, the Court went on to conclude that a person
soliciting sales also had to benefit from the transaction. "The language and purpose of §
12(1) suggest that liability extends only to the person who successfully solicits the
purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those
of the securities owner." Id. at 2079. The Court characterized the "substantial participant"
test as overly broad. As a technical matter the court in Dahl construed the definition of the
term "seller" only for purposes of Section 12(1). Id. at 2076 n.20. It seems unlikely that
the definition could be different for Section 12(2). Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the
older "substantial participant" test, of Section 12(2) could survive Dahl. Practitioners are
thus required to work with both standards pending further guidance from the court.
234. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1986)).
235. This statement reflects the views of the authors. See supra note 119.
236. Registrants not using Form S-2 may also be affected because a registration
statement incorporating by reference any portion of the annual report to shareholders must
contain an undertaking to supply the report upon request. Item 512(e) of Regulation S-K,
17 C.F.R. § 229.512 (1988). To the extent the annual report is sent prior to the sale, the
document seems subject to the proscriptions of Section 12(2).
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mary annual reports. Absent an exemption, Section 5 of the 1933
Act 237 prohibits the offer or sale of securities prior to the filing of
a registration statement.238 "Offer" has been interpreted broadly
to include disclosures that condition the market in advance of a
public offering.239 Promotional materials designed to stimulate
public interest in, and awareness of, a company may thus consti-
tute an illegal offer under Section 5.240 Once a registration state-
ment has been filed, but before the effective date, written offers
may be made only through a prospectus conforming with the re-
quirements of Section 10.24" 1 The definition of "prospectus" in-
cludes "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or
communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any
security for sale or confirms the sale of any security. '242 As a re-
sult, any written disclosure made after the registration statement
has been filed may be characterized as a prospectus in violation of
Section 5.243
The Commission has issued at least four releases designed to
237. Securities Act of 1933 § 5 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982)).
238. Section 5(c) prohibits an "offer to sell or offer to buy" securities prior to the
filing of a registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c)(1982). Section 5(a) prohibits the sale
of securities absent an effective registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982).
239. Publication of Information Prior to or After Effective Date of Registration
Statement, Securities Act Release No. 3,844, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 3,250 (Oct. 8,
1957). The Commission explained:
It apparently is not generally understood, however, that the publication of infor-
mation and statements, and publicity efforts, generally, made in advance of a
proposed financing, although not couched in terms of an express offer, may in
fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the
issuer or in the securities of an issuer in a manner which raises a serious question
whether the publicity is not in fact part of the selling effort.
Id. at 3,149. See also SEC v. Commercial Inv. & Dev., 373 F. Supp. 1153, 1164 (S.D. Fla.
1974)(holding that a newsletter and a letter authored by the company president constitute
an illegal offer); SEC v. Firestone Group, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 92,728, at 99,191 (D.D.C. 1970)(holding that promotional seminars precondition-
ing the market constitute an illegal offer); SEC v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211, 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1958)(press releases announcing company's assets, future projects, and a public
offering that would occur within 60 days deemed an illegal offer in violation of Section
5(c)). See also Brown, supra note 215, at 809.
240. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(2) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2)
(1986)).
241. Section 10 requires a prospectus to disclose certain information, including infor-
mation about the issuer's business, assets, and financial condition. Securities Act of 1933 §
10 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 770)(1986)).
242. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10)(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 776(10) (1986)).
243. See SEC v. Commercial Inv. & Dev. Corp., 373 F. Supp. 1153, 1164-65 (S.D.




clarify the boundaries of permissible disclosure during the black-
out period.2 44 During the black-out period, the Commission has
generally encouraged companies to refrain from unnecessary dis-
closures that may violate the securities laws. A company, however,
may make disclosures that would typically occur in the ordinary
course of business. Accordingly, a company can continue to re-
spond to unsolicited inquiries from shareholders, advertise prod-
ucts, send customary reports to shareholders, and issue press re-
leases with respect to factual matters and financial
developments.2 45 The emphasis is on ordinary prior conduct. If a
company has historically not engaged in certain types of activities,
such as advertising, the sudden implementation of an advertising
program during the black-out period may violate Section 5.
Distribution of an ordinary annual report during the black-
out period will not violate Section 5. This is true even where the
report is distributed to prospective investors and other non-share-
holder groups. The report must, however, be of the same general
"character and content" as those reports issued in prior years. 46
The use of a summary report during the black-out period
may raise concerns. The use of the more flexible format for the
first time during the black-out period may suggest market condi-
tioning. Even if the summary report had been used previously, the
reduced regulation under the proxy rules of the document's con-
tents may provide greater opportunities for incendiary comments
that could be construed as influencing the offering process. At a
244. Statement of the Commission Relating to Publication of Information Prior to or
After the Effective Date of a Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 3,844
(Oct. 4, 1957). 22 Fed Reg. 8359; Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers
Whose Securities Are in Registration, Securities Act Release No. 5,180, 1 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 3,056 (Aug. 16, 1971); Publication of Information Prior to or After the
Filing and Effective Date of a Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933,
Securities Act Release No. 5,009, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,744 (Oct. 7, 1969); Offers and Sales of Securities by Underwriters and Dealers, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 4,697, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 3257-3260 (June 5, 1964).
245. Securities Act Release No. 5,180, supra note 245. See also In re Carl M. Loeb,
Rhoades & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5,870, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,635 (Feb. 9, 1959)("This flow of normal corporate news, unrelated to
a selling effort for an issue of securities, is natural, desirable and entirely consistent with
the objective of disclosure to the public which underlies the federal securities laws.").
246. The Harper Group, SEC No-Action Letter, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,631, at 80,631-32 (May 3, 1976)("[T]his Division will not rec-
ommend any enforcement action . . . provided that the annual report is of the character
and content normally published by the company and does not contain material designed to
assist in the proposed offering.").
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minimum, the report should be drafted with added care and re-
duced hyperbole.
CONCLUSION
The GM/McKesson letters have suddenly acceded to man-
agement a huge, almost frightening amount of discretion in con-
nection with the annual report. Threshold questions of whether to
distribute an annual report at all, and if so, whether to use the
summary report format must be asked and answered. Those opt-
ing for the summary annual report must then determine the for-
mat and content that works best for them and their shareholders.
Decisions about the summary annual report ought to en-
courage the re-examination in toto of the shareholder communica-
tion process. With the adoption of the shareholder communication
rules, companies can now obtain the identity of non-objecting ben-
eficial owners and communicate directly with these sharehold-
ers.247 Direct communication will reduce costs, save time and per-
mit communication on a more frequent basis.
Companies may therefore want to implement a shareholder
relations strategy that involves an informative summary annual
report and more frequent communication, particularly updates
about corporate developments. Communications no longer need to
be wooden recitations of current developments. Use of a summary
annual report allows management to make shareholder communi-
cations informative, frank, and engaging. For example, sharehold-
ers might be apprised of new product developments. Given the
competition for aisle space in grocery stores, consumer food manu-
facturers may want to encourage brand loyalty and demand
among shareholders. Communications to shareholders might in-
clude discount coupons or other inducements. Shareholders then
will learn of new products and new marketing strategies, and will
be personally invited to participate. 48
247. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13 & .14c-7 (1988).
248. One problem with an advertising campaign directed toward shareholders con-
cerns restrictions in the proxy rules on the use of lists of non-objecting beneficial owners.
The lists may only be used for purposes of shareholder communications. Specifically, the
Commission has indicated that it is a misuse of a shareholder communication to seek in-
creased product sales. Facilitating Shareholder Communications, Exchange Act Release
No. 23,847, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,046, at 88,358
(Nov. 5, 1986)("Use of beneficial owner lists for product sales is not permitted."). To
circumvent the restriction, companies could mail corporate communications in which prod-
uct sales constituted only an incidental part. Given the overriding purpose of communicat-
[Vol. 39:39
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Constant, informative, honest communication from manage-
ment may enhance shareholder loyalty, a valuable commodity in
an era of hostile acquisitions. Likewise, companies can use effec-
tive communications as a way to enhance their community stand-
ing and increase business. Smaller bank and thrift holding compa-
nies often draw sizable amounts of business from particular
communities. Moreover, stock ownership will often be concen-
trated in the same community. Effective communications
strengthen both shareholder relations and standing within the
community.
In the long run, the flow of communications may be increas-
ingly two-way. Shareholders may be encouraged to communicate
their reactions to various changes of management. Perhaps com-
ment may be encouraged on esoteric corporate strategies such as a
possible reorganization or anti-takeover charter amendments.249
Shareholders may also be invited to comment on new products or
advertising campaigns.
In any event, the new flexibility provided by the use of a sum-
mary annual report means that strategy decisions concerning cor-
porate communication, including the type of communication and
content, are not controlled by legal concerns but by business con-
siderations. Lawyers should review communications for conform-
ity with the ubiquitous antifraud provisions but otherwise play a
minimal role in this new process.
ing with shareholders, no violation would seem to have occurred.
249. Of course, care would have to be taken that the request for comment does not
amount to a solicitation under Rule 14a-1. A solicitation would trigger the full panoply of
requirements under the proxy rules. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (1988).
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